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A vast, untapped resource is available to the federal government and the 
Department of Homeland Security in the war on terror. The citizens that comprise rural 
America have long been ignored by the efforts to wage the war on terror, and have been 
told, along with their urban counterparts, that the government would wage the war on 
terror, not citizens. Homeland Security’s message of vigilance in the war on terrorism 
and of prevention, mitigation, and recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not 
taking root in rural America because the communication methods are not effective. 
Terrorists are increasingly targeting rural America and using rural America for 
operational support and training. The special demographics, skills and abilities of rural 
Americans warrant further consideration by the Department of Homeland Security as a 
front on the war on terror.  
The findings and recommendations of this research advocate the creation of a 
domestic intelligence-gathering network, which utilizes the nation’s 2,946 local 
conservation districts to interact with rural citizens. Conservation districts, as a unit of 
local government, occupy a unique place in their local communities due to their non-
regulatory nature. As a result, they have a high degree of trust in their local communities. 
Conservation districts would forge a partnership with rural Americans and state fusion 
centers for information gathering purposes. Intelligence analysts would analyze that 
information at the state fusion center and use it to support the war on terror. In this way, 
the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. intelligence community could 
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A strategy that seeks lasting strength. 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157) 
 
An alternative strategy, more consistent with American tradition, would 
have been to reduce public fear through a different style of communication 
and governance and by more actively engaging citizens in their own 
preparedness and response. Such a strategy would attack the terror, not 
just the terrorists. This approach would have seen the administration 
working closely with the legislative and judicial branches to increase 
security without trespassing on liberty. It would aim at preserving national 
unity. In sum, it would be a strategy that seeks lasting strength. 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157) 
 
The federal government does not provide homeland security. Citizens do. 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 157) 
 
If you are talking about who is responsible for homeland security, my 
feeling is we all are. 
(S. Trefry, personal communication, September 8, 2009) 
 
Rural America has long been ignored in the efforts to wage the war on terrorism. 
While “rural” can be defined in many ways, even a conservative definition puts the 
number of Americans who live in rural areas at 17 percent of the entire U.S. population—
50 million people, (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30), “living on 80 percent of the 
land” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 6). The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has underserved rural America and told Americans as a whole 
that the government would wage the war on terrorism, not citizens. The special 
demographics of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front in the 
war on terrorism. Conservation districts, as a unit of local government, occupy a unique 




by DHS as a force multiplier. Homeland Security’s message of prevention, mitigation, 
and recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not taking root in rural America 
because communication methods are not effective. Homeland security for all Americans 
would be strengthened by an effective communications and education campaign 
implemented through a partnership with the nation’s 2,946 local conservation districts. 
“The best way to increase our ability as a nation to respond to disasters, natural or man-
made, is to enlist all citizens through education and engagement, which also happens to 
be a very good way to reduce the persistent anxieties that afflict us. We have not done 
this” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 156). 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Rural America has been largely ignored by the federal government in its effort to 
wage the war on terrorism. The DHS has underserved rural America and told Americans 
as a whole that the government would fight the war on terrorism, not citizens. The special 
demographics of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front in the 
war on terrorism. Further, DHS’s message of prevention, mitigation, response and 
recovery after terror events and natural disasters is not reaching rural America because 
the modes of communication it uses are not effective in rural America.  
Rural America is where terrorists can and do plan, prepare, and execute attacks, 
yet it is less than a full partner in the fight against terror. Rural America consists of up to 
80 percent of the land mass of the United States, an area too large for law enforcement 
from which to gather intelligence information, without help (Hamilton, Hamilton, 
Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Yet, the trust relationship between rural Americans, the 
federal government, and law enforcement has deteriorated. As a result, rural Americans 
generally have an intense dislike and distrust of the federal government, and this hinders 
the government’s ability to engage rural America in the war on terrorism.  
Funding for rural initiatives is meager compared to their urban counterparts. For 
fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated a combined total of $182 million in cooperative and 




state, local and tribal jurisdictions (Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security 
National Training Program (HSNTP), 2007). On the other hand, also in fiscal year 2007, 
DHS allocated just $11.6 million for the same training in rural communities by creating a 
Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC) through Eastern Kentucky University 
(Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security National Training Program (HSNTP), 
2007). Based on a population of 50 million, that adds up to roughly $4.31 per rural 
resident. Further, the RDPC is designed for rural first responder training, so grant funds 
are not allocated to rural citizens themselves, only to rural first responders.  
Rural communities also have unique emergency management needs that typically 
do not exist in metropolitan areas. These include the identification of property addresses 
for properties that encompass multiple acres and multiple structures, the storage of 
hazardous chemicals, fuels and pesticides in outbuildings, the presence of livestock and 
farm animals, and complex water, irrigation and feed storage systems.  
The meager attempts DHS has made to communicate with rural Americans have 
been ineffective. Current disaster and terrorism-related educational programs designed to 
reach the rural population (Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch) are unsuccessful 
because they do not communicate effectively to rural Americans. Further, rural 
Americans have an aversion to the use of technology, specifically the Internet, as a 
communication device. State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as 
their primary means of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication 
with rural America is crumbling.  
Americans traditionally are self-reliant, yet altruistic. “Self-reliance, reinforced by 
mutual assistance, is a fundamental American virtue” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). Rural 
survey respondents consistently value helping their neighbors, getting along, and working 
together to solve problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). 
However, Americans increasingly rely on the government to respond to the needs of 
victims of the disasters and terrorist events. Americans are losing their ability to be self-
reliant and take care of themselves. This places an unnecessary strain on the 




events. Rural Americans, though, understand that help may not be coming to them 
immediately after a disaster. They understand that local services may be too far away to 
respond or overwhelmed when they do respond (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 
25). Rural America is accustomed to limited resources and government assistance, and 
reliance on themselves and their neighbors. 
The U.S. government has not fully engaged rural America in the war on terror. As 
a result, citizens are not prepared, natural resources not protected, and DHS resources are 
being spent and used ineffectively. Efforts to engage rural America must take into 
account the unique characteristics of the vast rural areas and their populace. Successful 
partnership efforts with local conservation districts can result in the overall increase of 
American homeland safety and security.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is can rural America be 
leveraged to provide intelligence support to America in its fight against terrorism and in 
natural disaster prevention, response, recovery and mitigation? In seeking to answer this 
question, this thesis addresses a second set of questions. 
 What role can landowners, farmers, rural people, and conservation 
districts play as collectors of intelligence information in the war on terror?  
 What trust and privacy issues exist between rural Americans and the 
federal government, and can those issues be overcome so that rural 
Americans can become full partners in the war on terror with the federal 
government? 
 Can conservation districts train rural Americans to prepare, respond, 
mitigate and recover from terrorism and natural disasters, and if so, how 
can it be done cost-effectively? 
 Can conservation districts use their existing structure for communicating 
with local landowners to establish an effective means of collecting 
intelligence information related to terrorism and natural disasters, and if 








 Would a program that allows rural landowners to disclose hazardous 
materials or dangerous conditions on their land voluntarily to conservation 
districts for use by emergency responders (firefighters, police, (Emergency 
Medical Technician (EMT), Red Cross) in times of terror events and 
natural disasters be useful and cost effective?  
 If rural Americans do not use the Internet as their primary form of 
communication or their primary source of information, what do they use, 
why, and how can DHS access this and use it to communicate or 
disseminate information effectively about terrorism and natural disasters 
to rural Americans? 
 Are rural Americans willing to help in the war on terrorism, and if so, 
what would motivate them to do so and are there any privacy rights, laws 
or other concerns that might hinder their involvement?  
 What gaps exist in rural America that need to be filled before rural 
America can be involved in the war on terrorism?  
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis serves to renew the relationship between rural America and the U.S. 
Intelligence Community (IC). It fills a gap in the literature related to rural America’s role 
in the war on terrorism and effective disaster planning, mitigation, response and recovery 
efforts. It seeks to sharpen the focus on where best to allocate scarce resources to prevent 
terror attacks and provide information to first responders. This thesis explores the 
relationship between rural Americans and the local government agencies they work most 
closely with on a daily basis.  
This research serves as a starting point for further exploration of collaborative 
efforts between rural and urban populations. It adds a new operational capability to the IC 
and take advantage of relationships that already exist to fill gaps in information collection 
and gathering efforts in rural America. It seeks to link federal, state, and local information 
collection efforts in a practical and effective way to produce real results on the ground.  
The consumers of this research are local governments, law enforcement agencies, 




Homeland security practitioners and leaders are to gain an understanding of how 
rural Americans can assist in the war on terrorism and in disaster planning, mitigation, 
response and recovery efforts.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on using rural America in the war on terrorism and effectively aid 
in the prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery from natural disasters is nearly non-
existent. Studies that directly address this research question (i.e., “first tier” studies) 
cannot be found. The scant literature that does exist seems to have been created for some 
other purpose than analyzing whether rural America can be integrated into homeland 
security, and if so, how that can be done. In other words, the only literature that seems 
plentiful is “second tier” literature–relevant information that does not directly address the 
same topic.  
The problem seems to be that academia or the government has made little to no 
effort to combine the two areas of study. Most of the literature appears to be based around 
studies of rural America in general, attempts to define it, categorize it, and study it for its 
demographics, socio-economics, and to understand its nature. Similarly, most literature 
on the war on terrorism does not relate back to rural America and is generally divorced 
from making all but the most cursory relational connections to rural America, instead 
focusing on urban population centers and the war on terrorism. This focus on urban 
centers is understandable since the 9/11 attackers chose New York and Washington, D.C. 
as their targets, arguably the two most important urban centers in America. As a result, 
the literature that connects rural America to the war on terrorism is sparse, highly 
generalized, and limited in scope.  
However, there does seem to be ample literature on discrete aspects of the 
question of increasing the use of rural America in the war on terrorism. That literature 
centers mostly around rural law enforcement and first responders, although studies 





These studies and reports are generally more credible sources than news articles or other 
media as they are devoid of bias, opinion and speculation and are subject to peer review 
and comment.  
Generally, most of the literature involving rural America falls into five categories: 
(1) reports, studies, and statistical compilations of information about rural America 
gathered by federal, state, and local governments; (2) reports and studies of rural America 
commissioned by governmental agencies but authored by non-profit surrogate entities, 
universities, or colleges; (3) reports authored by or submitted to legislative bodies on the 
federal and state level dealing with the war on terrorism; (4) media articles and 
publications on rural America and the war on terrorism; and (5) plans, procedures, policy 
documents and pamphlets written by and for local governmental agencies that deal 
primarily with how those agencies interact, communicate, and serve rural America.  
Some governmental reports, studies, and statistical complications from the 
government are over a hundred years old (Census Bureau information, mainly), while 
others are current, up-to-date reports used in a variety of on-going governmental 
entitlement programs. Most of the rural studies and reports authored by non-profit entities 
deal with targeted research questions or issues that governmental agencies need answered 
to administer some portion of their program. Reports submitted to legislative bodies 
dealing with the war on terrorism and rural America generally are critiques of the efforts 
to wage the war against terror, outlines of current threats to America, or delineate 
successes in the war on terrorism. Media articles and publications contain the most 
current and expansive analysis of topics related to rural America and the war on 
terrorism. Finally, governmental plans, procedures and policy documents are generally 
recent in nature (post 9/11) and provide direction in operations and planning for local 
governmental agencies charged with either assisting rural America or addressing the war 
on terrorism and disaster response, planning, mitigation or recovery efforts, or some 





Perhaps at the outset the most important aspect of this research question is the 
definition of “rural.” While “rural” can be defined in many ways, even a conservative 
definition puts the number of Americans who live in rural areas at 17 percent of the entire 
U.S. population—50 million people (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30). America is 
much less problematic to define and generally not considered an issue. However, not 
many sources define rural, and the sources that do so vary widely. Some sources never 
define this term, believing, maybe, that the term is clear. Therefore, for those that do not 
define this term, it is unknown exactly what they mean when they use it. 
Establishing a definition of rural is akin to trying to hit a moving target. 
Dictionary definitions invariably include some aspect of living in the country or tie the 
definition to agriculture (Random House, 2009). The federal government uses many 
different definitions, often depending on the parameters of grant programs. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 has a definition of “local government,” which includes 
“rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity” (Homeland 
Security Act of 2002). For the general public, a Web site is even dedicated to determining 
if a user is “rural” for purposes of federal programs (Rural Assistance Center, 2008). It is 
not uncommon to receive both affirmative and negative responses when using the Web 
site, depending on which government program is being asked the question.  
The three most widely used rural definitions are based on administrative 
boundaries (United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) rural development 
programs), land use concepts (Census Bureau), or economic concepts, including 
“commuting areas” (Office of Management and Budget (OMB)) (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 
2008). They are all subject to considerable variation for socioeconomic characteristics. 
Typically, “urban” is defined first and whatever is left constitutes “rural.”  
Some researchers find it useful to define rural America further into three different 
categories, loosely based on economics: amenity-rich areas, declining resource-dependent 
areas, and chronically poor communities (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-
Baird, 2007). Such categorization of rural America is useful in targeting appropriate 




example, amenity-rich areas must ensure the successful integration of newcomers and 
long-term residents, while chronically poor communities focus on breaking the cycle of 
poverty (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007). 
Beyond definitional issues, rural America has long been ignored by the efforts to 
wage the war on terrorism. The DHS and the federal government as a whole should draw 
on the unique characteristics of rural America to assist in the fight against terrorism. 
Differing geography, population fluctuations due to tourism, limited access to specialized 
equipment and resources (HAZMAT), international border boundaries, equipment and 
staffing shortages, and communications all pose unique challenges to rural America 
(Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). However, most of the literature documenting these unique rural 
characteristics has come about through an analysis of rural first responders’ needs 
(Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). While many parallels exist between rural responders’ needs and 
rural America in general, there are differences, not only in population and scale, but also 
in the focus and purpose of the studies and analysis of the needs of rural first responders.  
On the other hand, at least one recent study shows there are factors unique to rural 
America that makes its citizens less prepared for disasters and terrorists events. Rural 
America is older, has less formal education, earns less and is increasingly populated by 
minorities; Hispanics in particular. As the study of preparedness by the Council for 
Excellence in Government shows, people “aged 65 or older are significantly less prepared 
than younger people,” adults with little high school education “are less prepared than 
those with a high school diploma or more education, those making $40,000 a year or 
lower are less likely to be prepared,” and “Hispanics are less likely to be prepared than 
white or African-Americans” (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006). 
Studies by non-profit organizations show that rural Americans generally have an 
intense dislike and distrust of the federal government. Further, they have an aversion to 
the use of technology, specifically the Internet, as a communication device. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive compilation of information related to rural America comes from the 





USDA, through the National Agriculture Statistics Service (NASS) conducts the census 
every five years, going back to the over 150 years to the 1840 census. The census was 
conducted by mail the entire time.  
Rural or farm usage of computers and the Internet is significantly less than the 
average population. In 2003, 62 percent of households had personal computers and 
Internet access (Day, Janus, & Davis, 2005), compared to just 39 percent of farmers 
(National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2002). Further, governmental Web sites related 
to disaster preparedness have been shown to generate low rates of usage among all 
Americans (Council for Excellence in Government, 2006).  
Studies show that rural residents prefer communication through their established 
networks (Dollisso & Martin, 2001). In one study, over 60 percent of the participants 
reported that the Internet was the least used source for agricultural information, and that 
overall, participants preferred to use magazines, neighbors, radio, and local Extension 
Services for information (Dollisso & Martin, 2001).  
Further studies show that privacy and the credibility of the government agency 
making contact with the rural population are key elements in successful communication 
between the government and rural America (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999). If a 
governmental agency lacks credibility within the rural community, or is seen as wanting 
private information without a valid reason, the communication shuts down (McCarthy, 
Johnson, & Ott, 1999). A 2003 Citizen Corps survey asked what would be the best way 
for an organization to provide information about disaster preparedness. In the national 
survey, regular mail was the most common response (41 percent), followed by TV or 
radio (24 percent) and local newspaper (15 percent)—only 6 percent indicated that the 
Internet was the best way to provide information (Citizen Corps, 2005, p. 12).  
State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary means 
of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication with rural America 
is breaking down. Rural America is not receiving preparedness information and the 




In congressional testimony, governmental agency reports, and presidential 
directives, the federal government acknowledges that domestic terrorism in rural areas 
and targeting rural areas is on the rise (Lewis, 2005). The agriculture, livestock, and food 
infrastructure in America is increasingly seen as a target for terrorists among 
governmental agencies (Daniels & Coates, 2001). Reports document malicious and 
terrorist attacks using food as a delivery system in the United States and abroad (Daniels 
& Coates, 2001).  
Further, case studies of domestic terrorist cells show that terrorists often use rural 
areas as bases or training grounds as it is easier to hide their activities in sparsely 
populated rural areas (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), while statistical investigations 
commissioned by governmental agencies show that terrorists are increasingly using local, 
rural communities as a base to conduct operations (Smith, 2008).  
In local governmental publications and outreach materials, it can be show that 
rural Americans understand that help may not be coming to them immediately after a 
disaster (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006). Pamphlets, manuals, and other outreach 
materials exist to educate rural Americans on how they could plan for, mitigate, respond 
to and recover from natural disasters and terrorist events (Jefferson Conservation District, 
2006). However, there are few, if any, materials directed towards recruiting rural 
Americans to help in the fight against domestic terrorism.  
The literature available related to the question of integrating rural America into 
the war on terrorism is sparse, fragmented, and uncoordinated. Various levels of 
government, governmental agencies, universities, and non-profit organizations have 
produced a wide amount of information that needs to be gathered together to provide an 
overall picture of the possibilities of matching rural America with DHS efforts in the war 
on terrorism. Most of the literature that exists consists of high quality studies and 




E. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH/FURTHER QUESTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis focuses on a gap that exists in the U.S. IC with regard to domestic 
intelligence collection and coordination efforts in rural America. It uses conservation 
districts as an intermediary between the IC and rural America. Conservation districts are 
known and trusted by rural Americans. Districts, their supervisors, and staff could be 
leveraged to repair and enhance the relationship between the federal government and 
rural America. The research for this thesis focused on the local and state level, but more 
research could be done on a nation-wide basis to gauge the efficacy of this proposal.  
Furthermore, other avenues for reaching rural America could be explored. The 
Cooperative Extension System Offices of the United States Department of Agriculture’s 
National Institute of Food and Agriculture could be integrated into this effort. The 
Extension Service is the educational arm of the Department of Agriculture. One or more 
experts who provide useful, practical, and research-based information to agricultural 
producers, small business owners, youth, consumers, and others in rural areas and 
communities of all sizes staff their offices. The Extension Service is significantly 
different from conservation districts in a number of ways: they have no field staff, fewer 
local offices, have a regional focus across state lines rather than local focus, and their 
employees work directly for the federal government rather than a local government 
entity. However, the Extension Service has a wealth of information, knowledge, and 
understanding about the demographics and issues of rural America that could be accessed 
to enhance this proposal further. This line of research warrants further investigation.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Research Design 
This thesis question involves the use of conservation districts (local, non-
regulatory state governmental entities) to assist in information gathering and collection in 






natural disasters and terrorism. The scope of this research is limited to assessing these 
conditions in Washington State, and further research can entail a nation-wide 
investigation.  
Two research methods were used to collect data. The first method employed the 
qualitative collection of data from seven subjects who represented managers, supervisors, 
landowners, farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation 
associations, national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the 
aforementioned on a regular basis. The second method used was an on-line survey of 
supervisors, landowners and farmers associated with conservation districts.  
The interviewees and survey respondents were chosen as they could provide 
information about the efficacy of this thesis and the ability of conservation districts to 
execute the proposed action (i.e., act as gatherers and collectors of information). They 
were asked about their involvement in the war on terrorism and natural disasters, their 
opinions about both of those topics, their degree of trust in the current intelligence 
gathering community, and the value of this area of research. Interviewees were chosen in 
an effort to provide qualitative data, while survey respondents were chosen in an attempt 
to gather a broader range of data.  
2. Population  
The population for this thesis consisted of managers, supervisors, landowners, 
farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation associations, 
national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the aforementioned on 
a regular basis. Conservation district supervisors are elected to serve on the boards of 
conservation districts. Three of the five board supervisors must be owners of farms. 
Districts cover an entire state, both urban and rural areas. All interviewees and survey 
respondents were from Washington State. Interviewees were subject matter experts who 
consisted of four staff members of the Washington State Conservation Commission 
(WSCC), two conservation district supervisors who were also landowners, and one 




hold elected or appointed positions on the Board of the National Association of State 
Conservation Agencies (NASCA). The on-line survey was sent to 95 conservation district 
supervisors in Washington State. Of those 95, 33 completed the survey (35 percent). All 
survey respondents who started the survey finished the survey.  
Interviewees and survey respondents were recruited through a network of 
relationships established by the author as a staff member of the WSCC and the 
conservation districts existing in Washington State. Interviewees were contacted to 
participate in this research through e-mail, telephone, and personal contact. Survey 
respondents were contacted though e-mail for participation in the on-line survey. The 
interviews and the survey were conducted during the fall of 2009.   
The WSCC and the conservation districts work closely together to further natural 
resource conservation in Washington State. Both entities work with landowners, farmers, 
and ranchers to achieve their conservation goals. Neither the WSCC nor the conservation 
districts are regulatory agencies, but seek rather to assist landowners, ranchers and 
farmers in complying with local, state, and federal laws and regulations.  
3. Instruments Used in Data Collection 
Two instruments were employed to collect data for this research. One instrument 
was an interview. The interview consisted of 20 questions (see Appendix A for a copy of 
the interview questions). The target audience was managers, supervisors, landowners, 
farmers and senior management of conservation districts, state conservation associations, 
national conservation associations, and those who interacted with the aforementioned on 
a regular basis. Interviewees came from across Washington State. The interview 
questions were designed to assess the involvement and trust that these persons have in 
their systems, duties, and responsibilities as they related to the war on terrorism, disaster 
response, and their interaction with the homeland security IC. The interview questions 
asked participants to rate their agreement in their agency’s/jurisdiction’s ability to 
perform operations and interactions with the IC. There were three main areas of inquiry: 




activities a conservation district could be involved in or currently involved in related to 
homeland security. The inquiry into information exchange, collaboration and 
communication sought to investigate the current state of information exchange and 
collaboration between conservation districts, local law enforcement, and homeland 
security agencies, and to identify any obstacles that might exist to that exchange. The 
inquiry into trust sought to assess trust issues among the government (federal, state, 
local), rural private landowners, and conservation district staff and supervisors who were 
members of their own rural communities. Interview questions differed slightly in diction 
and tone for conservation district directors, supervisors, and managers versus farmers, 
ranchers and landowners.  
The other instrument was a survey. The on-line survey was sent to respondents 
across Washington State. The survey consisted of ten questions (see Appendix B for a 
copy of the survey questions). The target audience was conservation district supervisors 
(who were also landowners in the area) and managers. The survey tool was designed to 
assess the involvement and trust that these persons have in their systems, duties, and 
responsibilities as they related to the war on terrorism, disaster response, and their 
interaction with their federal, state, and local IC. The survey asked participants to rate 
their agreement in their agency’s/jurisdiction’s ability to perform operations and 
interactions with the IC. The survey was sent electronically through an on-line service 
(SurveyMonkey.com).  
4. Data Collection Procedures 
The purpose, scope, and conditions of participation of the research were explained 
to all participants. The researcher explained to interviewees that they would be audio 
taped and the results of the interview transcribed so that interviewees may be quoted 
directly. All interviewees agreed to the conditions of participation. Interviewees were sent 
a copy of the transcription by e-mail for verification of accuracy. No transcript was 
returned by a participant for more editing. All interviews were conducted at the 
interviewee’s place of business, at their convenience. Survey respondents were greater in 




responses were kept anonymous and no identifying question was asked of the 
respondents. Interviewees were recruited through a currently established network of 
relationships established by the researcher as a staff member of the WSCC and the 
conservation districts that exist in Washington State. Interviewees were contacted through 
e-mail, telephone and personal contact for recruitment. All interviews were conducted in 
person by the researcher, except for one conducted telephonically. Prior to each 
interview, informed consent was given for the interview and the tape recording of the 
interview by all interviewees. Survey respondents were contacted by e-mail only through 
a public e-mail listing of conservation district supervisors and managers. E-mails were 
sent asking them to participate in the survey, and to log onto the survey Web page on 
SurveyMonkey.com.  
5. Analysis of Data 
Both the interviews and the survey were synthesized in the author’s analysis of 
this thesis research. Interview responses and survey results are cited throughout this thesis 
to provide the data from which arguments are made. Generally, a number of different 
points can be deduced from summarizing the results of the interviews and survey.  
 The recognition of the unique non-regulatory nature of conservation 
districts. Conservation districts, while a local division of state government, 
have no regulatory powers over their constituents. Districts serve and 
assist those farmers, ranchers and landowners within their boundaries with 
their natural resource conservation needs. This gives districts a unique 
place in their communities, between those who regulate (other government 
agencies) and the regulated (the public). The placement of conservation 
districts between these two parties allows for districts to serve as agents of 
information exchange for communication purposes, and allows districts to 
interact beyond information exchange with both parties to implement 
natural resource conservation practices. This creates a wealth of trust 
between the districts and the government agencies, and the districts and 
the public. The districts strive to serve the public by assisting the public 
with the regulatory agencies, and this in turn, creates trust. 
 The need to maintain privacy when it comes to private rural landowners, 
ranchers and farmers. Conservation districts have built relationships 
between themselves and those they serve by maintaining their 
confidentiality and privacy interests to the extent allowed by law. If rural 




gathering efforts, that privacy must be maintained for their voluntary 
participation in such a program.  
 The need to conduct more training and informational meetings on the 
nature of the terrorist and natural disaster threat to rural areas. A high 
level of denial of the possibility of any terror threat in rural areas exists, 
yet there was recognition that more information is needed to have a better 
understanding of the nature and likelihood of the threat. Most rural 
communities are very integrated and vigilant to new developments in their 
area, but would need some further direction on what to report and to 
whom when it comes to homeland security. Further, recognition that rural 
private landowners are an important part of infrastructure protection exists 
given the large amount of land they control.  
 The need to support rural areas with more funding to effectuate more 
interaction, dialogue, training, and information exchange among rural 
Americans and government at all levels with regard to homeland security 
information. Conservation districts are almost entirely dependent on grant 
funding to conduct their operations, and this hampers their ability to create 
and maintain programs over the long term. Further, districts in rural areas 
have even more limited funding than their urban counterparts, yet rural 
districts are called on to serve their communities in a broader range of 
areas than urban districts.  
 The recognition that conservation districts could provide information and 
training to their constituents in the course of the duties already provided. 
Conservation district supervisors and staff are already out in the field 
contacting farmers, ranchers and landowners in remote areas that can 
participate in a formal program to exchange suspicious activity 
information. They already provide services during times of natural 
disaster, including preparation, mitigation, and recovery. Depending on 
the type of information exchange system created, districts can implement 
such an information gathering system with minor adjustments to their 
current functions and methodologies. While responding to disasters is 
nothing new for districts, taking a more active role in homeland security 
is. That new role might cause concern among the supervisors and staff of 
district and it is necessary to address those concerns. In addition, district 
staffing issues might be a concern given the type of program created.  
 
 A need exists to provide high quality training and information to rural 
landowners, farmers and ranchers about dangerous conditions or 
hazardous materials possibly on their property. Ranchers and farmers 
typically employ the use of pesticides and herbicides during the course of 
their operations, and not all have the information to use, dispose, or secure 




 It is recognized that law enforcement in rural areas is limited in resources 
and that creates gaps and other areas that terrorists and criminals might 
exploit. While some concern exists about becoming directly involved in 
the apprehension or confrontation of criminals and terrorists in rural areas, 
it is recognized that observable events can be reported more frequently, 
easily, and effectively if a trusted, local collector of that information 
exists.  
 The need to maintain traditional modes of communication between the 
government and the public in rural areas. While increased use of 
electronic media is occurring (i.e., the Internet) to communicate, the total 
reliance by government agencies on Web sites to communicate with the 
public is not effective at generating trust between the government and the 
rural public. Farmers and ranchers continue to use traditional means of 
obtaining information (newspapers, radio, and television), in addition to 
using the Internet among the younger generation. Web sites are seen as 
useful for communicating mundane information about programs, but not 
for generating trust of the kind that needs to exist for valuable information 
exchange between the communicators.  
 A need exists to ensure proper protocols and systems are in place for the 
collection, use and dissemination of any information obtained from 
private, rural landowners, farmers and ranchers. Having protocols in 
place for the collection, use and dissemination of information from rural 
Americans establishes confidence in the system created, and thereby, 
creates more trust among those using it.   
 A need exists to identify clearly what homeland security is, how it applies 
to rural areas, and who is responsible for it. Providing that information to 
rural Americans can serve to bring clarity to the roles and responsibilities 
of homeland security practitioners in rural areas, and build confidence and 




II. DEFINING RURAL AMERICA 
A. THREE MAIN DEFINITIONS 
Establishing a definition of rural is akin to trying to hit a moving target. 
Dictionary definitions invariably include some aspect of living in the country or tie the 
definition to agriculture (Random House, 2009). The federal government uses many 
different definitions, often depending on the parameters of grant programs. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 has a definition of “local government,” which includes 
“rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity” (Homeland 
Security Act of 2002). For the general public, there is even a government Web site 
dedicated to determining if a user is “rural” for purposes of federal programs (Rural 
Assistance Center, 2008). It is not uncommon to receive affirmative and negative 
responses when using the Web site, depending on which government program is being 
asked the question.  
The three most widely used rural definitions are based on administrative 
boundaries (United States Department of Agriculture rural development programs), land 
use concepts (U.S. Census Bureau), or economic concepts, including “commuting areas” 
(Office of Management and Budget); (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 29). All 
definitions are subject to considerable variation for socioeconomic characteristics. The 
typical method to define rural is to define “urban” first, and whatever is left constitutes 
“rural.” Historically, the nation has often viewed rural America as a “residual.” In 
population statistics, for instance, the rural population is what is left over once the cities 
are counted” (Drabenstott, 2002, p. 2). For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 depicts a 
graphical depiction of the size and scope of the Census Bureau’s definition of “rural” 





Figure 1.   Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan Counties meeting the Census Bureau 
Definition of “Rural.” (From: Economic Research Service, 2004). 
B. EFFECTS OF THOSE DEFINITIONS ON POLICY 
Some researchers find it useful to define rural America further into three different 
categories, loosely based on economics: amenity-rich areas, declining resource-dependent 
areas, and chronically poor communities (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-
Baird, 2007, p. 4). Such categorization of rural America is useful in targeting appropriate 
resources, grant monies, educational campaigns, and terrorism investigations. For 
example, amenity-rich areas must ensure the successful integration of newcomers and 
long-term residents, while chronically poor communities focus on breaking the cycle of 
poverty (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007, p. 4). Further 
refinement of a definition of rural America allows the targeted application of national 





Regardless of refining the definition of rural, the choice of one’s definition of the 
term brings with it the possibility of great variance in numbers. If, as some claim, “[t]he 
share of the U.S. population considered rural ranges from 17 to 49 percent depending on 
the definition used” (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 29), that variance has great 
implications for public policy. Implementing a public policy initiative involving 50 
million people versus 150 million people involves assigning greater time, effort and 
resources to the task. 
C. DEFINITION FOR PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
For purposes of this thesis, the term “rural” is defined using the most conservative 
definition available—utilizing all three concepts and combining the two most well known 
definitions of rural—the USDA’s administrative definition and the OMB’s economic 
concept. This results in a calculation of 17 percent of the U.S. population (50 million 
people) as “rural” (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, p. 30). Even using this very conservative 
definition, rural America is large and “new pressures from globalization, demographic 
shifts, migration, landscape transformation, and resource limits are reshaping rural life. 
Fifty million people live in small towns and rural communities—17 percent of the 
nation’s population, living on 80 percent of the land” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & 








III. A RURAL INFORMATION NETWORK 
The harvest is plentiful, but the workers are few. 
 
(The Bible: New International Version, 2006) 
 
A. DEFINITION 
The Rural Information Network (RIN) is a knowledge management and 
information sharing system, created either entirely new or by modifying existing systems. 
The RIN focuses the efforts of rural Americans on the collection of information for 
processing by trained intelligence analysts, who “harvest” the information channeled to 
them for use in fusion center products and dissemination to the U.S. Intelligence IC. In 
this way, rural America becomes a force multiplier for the DHS in the war on terrorism.  
The RIN operates by having individual, private landowners or rural Americans 
voluntarily supply information to their local conservation district staff and supervisors 
who then input that information into a secure database for transmittal to a central point (a 
state fusion center) for analysis. Conservation district staff and supervisors possess 
training in the collection of information themselves, and in the operation of the RIN 
database. Information communication methods include face-to-face personal interactions, 
telephone calls, text messages, e-mails, and other forms of communication. Figure 2 
illustrates the communication pathways of the RIN. The information is then processed 
and exploited by trained analysts at state fusion centers for production and distribution to 





Figure 2.   The Diagram of the RIN Connections. 
The RIN collects information from all points in rural America and channels it to 
conservation district staff and supervisors. Staff and supervisors, rather than traditional 
intelligence analysts, are in the field on a daily basis. They do not spend a lot of time in 
the office. As such, they are in a unique position to know the community, their neighbors, 
the landscape and the infrastructure that exist in rural America.  
A stakeholder group is established to set requirements and product deliverables. 
The RIN creates an on-going communications cycle between rural America and the IC, 
allowing for a continuous dialogue and true communication to occur. This serves to 
rebuild the trust relationship between the federal government, the IC, and rural America.  
The RIN is designed to meet the new asymmetric terrorism threat to America, 
which requires that the IC create and use new domestic intelligence methods and sources. 
By leveraging rural America in domestic intelligence efforts in the war on terrorism 
through partnership with a division of local government (conservation districts), the IC 
can more readily meet this asymmetric terrorism threat. The war on terrorism requires the 
IC to employ new methods of collection and to alter its information-sharing paradigm. 




find new methods to engage rural Americans in this fight. If DHS can leverage rural 
America in the fight against terror, then it can have additional sets of eyes and ears up to 
at least 17 percent of the American population—50 million people (Cromartie & 
Bucholtz, 2008). The RIN can be newly created or modified from existing systems to 
meet the needs of rural America and DHS. It can connect with the IC through fusion 
centers and the DHS Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portal.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) 
and the Interim National Preparedness Goal set forth policy directives for preparing to 
meet the challenges of terrorist events and natural disasters (Homeland Security Directive 
8: National Preparedness, 2003; Interim National Prepardness Goal, 2005). The 
capability-specific priority in HSPD-8 that the RIN most directly meets is 3.2.1: 
information sharing and collaboration to enable effective prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery activities; not just for terrorism, but also for natural disasters. 
Priority 3.2.1 acknowledges, “[e]ffective terrorism prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery efforts depend on timely and accurate information” about terrorists and their 
operations, targets, and methods (Interim National Prepardness Goal, 2005, p. 12). By 
“collecting, blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array 
of sources on a continual basis,” homeland security is enhanced (Interim National 
Prepardness Goal, 2005, p. 13). This effort is to be undertaken horizontally within the 
federal government and vertically between the federal, state, local, tribal, and private 
sector. However, while HSPD-8 recognizes that citizen involvement is paramount in the 
war on terrorism, the limited avenues that DHS has created for citizen participation are 
largely ineffective (Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch) concerning information 
collection efforts.  
B. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
This section analyzes the use of rural America in the war on terrorism through the 
seven phases of the intelligence cycle as it applies in the RIN. In the contexts of the RIN, 
this section examines those components of the intelligence cycle that are functional, those 




The seven elements of the intelligence cycle are (1) identifying requirements, (2) 
collection, (3) processing and exploitation, (4) analysis and production, (5) dissemination, 
(6) consumption, and (7) feedback (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55). Figure 3 displays the 
intelligence cycle. The RIN focuses the efforts of rural Americans on the collection of 
information for processing by trained intelligence analysts. As such, it is primarily 
involved with the collection slice of the intelligence pie.  
 
 
Figure 3.   The Intelligence Cycle. (From: Directorate of Intelligence). 
1. Identifying Requirements 
Identifying requirements is the process by which types of intelligence are 
collected and then those policy areas that need intelligence are determined and prioritized 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55). Prioritizing must be done because resources are limited. Policy 
areas are typically prioritized based on perceived level of threat or an importance versus 
likelihood analysis (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 58).  
Generally, in the war on terrorism, the federal government has set intelligence 
requirements through a variety of strategy documents, presidential directives, and 




is acknowledged by the federal government as a target for terrorists, as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers eco-terrorism to be the number one domestic 
terrorism threat (Lewis, 2005), and eco-terrorists are targeting rural America. Earth 
Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front attacks include targeting fur farmers, 
forestry services, federal land, meat packing plants, lumber facilities, and other rural 
locations (Lewis, 2005). Further, Homeland Security Presidential Directive #9 recognizes 
that “America’s agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, interconnected, 
diverse, and complex structure providing potential targets for terrorist attacks” (News 
Releases: The White House, 2004). The Food and Drug Administration has “long 
understood that our public food and water supplies are among the most likely avenues for 
terrorist threats” (Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 3).  
While the RIN would focus the efforts of rural Americans on collection of 
information for processing by trained intelligence analysts, it would also serve to re-focus 
the identification of intelligence requirements from urban to rural America. DHS 
directives and strategy documents generally acknowledge that some state and local 
governmental policy choices (i.e., the protection of critical infrastructure and key 
resources) also contribute to the identification of requirements. Rural America, through 
its local and state government representatives, has been given the opportunity to 
contribute to the setting of requirements related to rural areas. While rural American 
residents typically have an idea of the kinds of threats they are facing, they sometimes 
need additional information from the state and federal government to prioritize needs in 
their area properly. Sensitive infrastructure or a key resource might exist in their area that 
is secret or otherwise non-disclosed. Differing geography, population fluctuations due to 
tourism, limited access to specialized equipment and resources (i.e., HAZMAT), 
international border boundaries, equipment and staffing shortages, and communications 
all pose unique challenges to rural America (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003), and impose unusual 
information requirements on those responsible for intelligence in their communities.  
Further, while information typically flows well horizontally between levels of 




due to the inability of the national government to communicate effectively with local 
governments and rural America. In addition, rural Americans and local governments 
generally have a long-term view of requirements and the needs of their communities 
while state and federal governmental representatives have shorter time spans associated 
with their requirements.   
2. Collection 
Collection is the process of producing raw information (not intelligence) that can 
be used by intelligence analysts after is has undergone processing and exploitation. Many 
different collection disciplines or INTs exist: MASINT (Measurement and Signatures 
Intelligence), HUMINT (Human Intelligence), SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), GEOINT 
(Geospatial Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), COMINT (Communications 
Intelligence), TELINT) Telemetry Intelligence, and OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 107).  
Collection is likely the area of the intelligence process in which rural America can 
make the greatest contribution, specifically in OSINT and HUMINT, and to a lesser 
extent, GEOINT and MASINT. The RIN would be most effective in these areas. 
Rural Americans have a high degree of physical and social interconnectivity 
within the areas they live. As collectors of information, they can provide information 
about unusual activity and unfamiliar persons in their communities. Terrorists are 
increasingly using local, rural communities as a base to conduct operations. A National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) study found that “committing an act of terrorism will usually 
involve local preparations” (Smith, 2008). Further, almost half (44 percent) of all 
terrorists examined lived within 30 miles of their targets (Smith, 2008). This has great 
implications for eco-terrorism, which has already been noted to affect rural America 
inordinately and to be on the rise. The NIJ study acknowledged that much of the terrorist 
conduct is not necessarily criminal in nature, but “early intelligence may give law 





Rural America, by its very nature, is keenly aware of local issues, critical 
infrastructure and key resources necessary for the nation’s security. Due to their 
connection to the land, rural Americans have a greater stake in issues that affect them 
locally than urban populations, which are highly mobile and transitory, while rural 
Americans are not mobile and have invested in their land and communities.  
The RIN involves the use of conservation districts to collect and gather 
information, either directly through their own staff or in conjunction with rural 
Americans. Conservation districts are a local government structure familiar to and 
accessible by rural Americans easily utilized to communicate with and gather information 
from rural Americans. Their structure consists of a network of over 2,946 conservation 
districts and nearly 15,000 men and women who serve on their governing boards 
(National Assocation of Conservation Districts). Conservation districts are local units of 
government established under state laws to execute natural resource management 
programs at the local level (National Assocation of Conservation Districts). Districts 
work with millions of cooperating landowners and operators to help them manage and 
protect land and water resources on all private lands and many public lands in the United 
States (National Assocation of Conservation Districts). Districts “share a single mission: 
to coordinate assistance from all available sources—public and private, local, state and 
federal–in an effort to develop locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns” 
(Sims, 2007). Conservation districts are already involved in a number of programs 
concerned with disaster preparedness and mitigation, have technical expertise to operate 
in rural areas, and are trusted and respected by rural Americans (Jefferson Conservation 
District, 2006).  
Conservation districts could also help landowners who wish to participate 
voluntarily to collect information related to a variety of hazardous or dangerous materials 
or substances on their property (fuel, explosives, heavy equipment, animals, retaining 
ponds, weapons and ammunition, and structures (homes, barns/outbuildings)). District 
staff can collect operational information, such as reporting on congregations of vehicles 




by training operations in remote locations. Individual landowners and farmers could 
voluntarily provide tactical information, such as reporting the locations of propane tanks, 
ammonium nitrate, anhydrous ammonia tanks, fertilizer storage facilities, or water 
pumping infrastructure. Local incident commanders can then have immediate access to 
that information during natural disasters or terror events involving that land or area. Not 
only is such information useful for prevention purposes, but also for response during 
times of natural disaster or terrorist events.  
The RIN can enhance intelligence capabilities by increasing the ability to manage 
the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of 
government and the private sector on a continual basis, especially in rural areas. A state 
fusion center can analyze any information collected and gathered at the local level by the 
conservation districts, share that information, as appropriate, with local law enforcement, 
businesses and rural community members, and disseminate that information through 
reports, situational awareness bulletins, and other products. Through the relationships 
developed by the RIN, the fusion center can define rural intelligence customers and 
assess their needs, develop a network capable of obtaining intelligence in an unclassified 
form to nontraditional customers, such as state, local, and tribal governments and the 
private sector, and integrate applicable non-law enforcement disciplines into intelligence 
analysis and information sharing processes. The RIN can encourage the removal of 
impediments to information sharing within the IC, and the establishment of a need-to-
share versus a need-to-know culture for all data. This effort is voluntary on the part of 
rural individuals, landowners, farmers and ranchers. Local law enforcement, as partners 
with the fusion center, benefit by increased and enhanced reporting of suspicious 
activities and circumstances, vetted through trained conservation district staff, 
supervisors, and fusion center analysts.  
The RIN can enhance counter-terrorism investigation and law enforcement 
capabilities by increasing their capability to deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, apprehend, 
and prosecute suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security by 




enforcement benefits by the exponential increase in capable “eyes and ears” of members 
of the rural public in reporting and watching out for suspicious circumstances and 
behavior, in areas previously unavailable to law enforcement. The RIN fosters 
collaboration and cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement to 
investigate and resolve incidents and investigations by breaking down the stovepipes of 
jurisdictional boundaries between urban and rural areas and involving a greater number 
of rural citizens in the prevention and detection of terrorism. The RIN raises the 
awareness of rural citizens to terrorism, terrorist activities, plans, tactics and threats. It 
enhances the readiness and capabilities of state, regional, tribal, and local operational 
teams, law enforcement agencies, and key non-law enforcement homeland security 
disciplines in rural areas through the education and training for rural citizens. Rural 
citizens add to the resources that law enforcement can draw from to combat terrorism.  
It is essential that American citizens be a part of the joint intelligence effort to 
combat terrorism. The failure to include them in a meaningful way in the war on 
terrorism does not achieve unity of effort. “U.S. intelligence must learn more about 
American institutions as partners while seeking to educate the American people about 
intelligence” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198). Further, the success of domestic U.S. intelligence 
efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 
2005, p. 198).  
A typical American citizen likely needs some education and training in the art of 
information collection, but that does not mean that the IC or DHS should not undertake 
this effort. “The essence of intelligence success in the homeland is voluntary 
cooperation...” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 208). If Americans properly understand the new 
terrorism threat America faces and possess a few rudimentary tools to deal with it (i.e., 
knowledge in disaster preparation and information gathering), then they are more than 
willing to cooperate voluntarily in the war on terrorism. “Much of the U.S. public, now 
under increasing threat, supports U.S. intelligence” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 214).  
This voluntariness is the key to addressing the privacy considerations as well. The 




but also externally among its clients, the more the American public allows it to do its job. 
“The sharpest weapon… [is] a citizen imbued with patriotism, independence, and free 
will” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 215) and one that has a clear understanding and appreciation of 
the nature of the threat America faces in the war on terrorism.  
3. Processing and Exploitation 
Processing and exploitation means the deconstruction of the information received 
and re-packaging of it into useful intelligence. The technical expertise that conservation 
district staff have related to crop rotation, water usage, and natural resources are helpful 
in processing and exploitation involving MASINT and GEOINT data. Conservation 
district staff and supervisors require training in the collection and documentation of this 
kind of information, but they are already familiar with the collection of this kind of 
information and technologies associated with it. Conservation district staff regularly 
interprets satellite imagery, GIS data, sensor data (water usage, temperature, soil 
moisture, etc.) in their daily duties.  
4. Analysis and Production 
Analysis and production is the domain of the trained intelligence analyst as it 
involves combining the raw data into a written document that summarizes its meaning 
and makes conclusions. The reports and tips generated or collected by district staff can be 
collated by trained intelligence analysts in each state.  
5. Dissemination 
Dissemination is the process of “moving the intelligence from the producers to the 
consumers” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 62). Having the information come into a single analyst 
in a state fusion center keeps costs to a minimum while maximizing the utility of the 
information gathered by those in the field. A precedent for this kind of staffing at fusion 






Consumption refers to the actual use of the intelligence by the end-user; generally, 
the concern is with how the information is consumed and whether it is presented to the 
consumer in a useful way. Again, trained analysts can be used to ensure requirements are 
being met. Information can flow back from the fusion center to the conservation districts 
and local law enforcement with minimal security clearance requirements, ensuring the 
broadest possible dissemination of threat information.  
7. Feedback 
Feedback is, ideally, a continual cycle of communication between the IC and the 
policy community (those who set the requirements) with the policymakers giving 
direction to the IC on what is working and what needs to be improved. As noted above, 
the key to successful feedback is continuous, open and two-way communication between 
the producers and the consumers. Feedback in this situation can be difficult due to the 
large numbers of collectors, but products can be crafted for broad dissemination, similar 
to N.Y.P.D.’s S.H.I.E.L.D. Appendix C reflects the author’s proposed product for 
intelligence dissemination under the RIN. 
Some might argue that rural American’s should just join Citizen Corps Councils 
(http://www.citizencorps.gov/) and actively engage in emergency services activities, 
rather than create a new structure involving conservation districts assisting them in 
information gathering. Citizen Corps, however, does not actively engage in information 
gathering efforts, but rather in emergency preparedness efforts. It urges its volunteers to 
be personally responsible for participating in “crime prevention and reporting,” but limits 
training to “taking classes in emergency preparedness, response capabilities, first aid, 
CPR, fire suppression, and search and rescue procedures” (Citizen Corps). Further, some 
rural “people are really leery about the government” and prefer to “step up to the plate on 
their own terms and participate without having to gain someone else’s trust in the 
government” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). They can use a 




build a relationship with a new organization (Citizen Corps). DHS should not exclude a 
large segment of the population because they do not want to become formally involved 
with the federal government. Further, Citizen Corps purportedly serves 78 percent of the 
total U.S. population (Citizen Corps), but a close review of the information supplied by 
Citizen Corps shows that the councils closely mirror the major population centers of the 
states and are mostly councils “in name only” without any further local connection to 
their communities except for state-wide activations. Conservation district staff, on the 
other hand, are based in every county, parish, or local governmental entity across the 
nation, regardless of population center (urban and rural), and furthermore, their staff 
actively travel the countryside making daily contacts with private landowners, farmers, 
and others in their communities. They are much more closely connected to local rural 
communities than Citizen Corps.  
Currently, the DHS encourages the reporting of “suspicious activity” using their 
Web site to leave a tip for the FBI (Report Incidents). Most rural Americans are not 
comfortable involving the federal government in something in their local area (J. Culp, 
personal communication, September 24, 2009). However, if a local contact point exists 
with whom they are comfortable interacting they are much more likely to make that 
report or voluntarily allow access to their land to gather information or conduct 
surveillance (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Information 
communication methods can include face-to-face personal interactions, telephone calls, 
text messages, e-mails, and other forms of communication (meetings, workshops, etc.). 
The RIN can be designed to allow for multiple methods of reporting suspicious activity 
by rural citizens, similar to how urban citizens can make reports using a variety of 
formats familiar to them (i.e., texting, e-mail, postings on Internet social media sites, 
telephone, and personal contact. Conservation district staff and supervisors pass that 
information along to the fusion center for further analysis and production.  
Any new organization designed to collect domestic intelligence must be 
acceptable by the public (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). Using conservation districts to gather raw 




America about rudimentary information collection methods and providing specific, 
targeted training for conservation district staff members is all that is needed. 
Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and maintain a high level of 
“institution based trust” with their constituents—trust in the districts themselves (Jackson, 
2009). By providing training to them and instituting an effective public relations 
campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that training, rural 
Americans and district staff members can become another set of eyes and ears in the war 
on terror. As one manager noted, “districts could be in a position, as neighbors out in the 
country, in more rural-populated districts, to be those eyes and ears or help promote eyes 
and ears” (M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009). The success of 
domestic U.S. intelligence efforts relies on “the forging of a deep partnership with the 
American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, the collection and analysis 
of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” (Loyka et al., 2005, p. 6). 
C. PURPOSE OF THE RIN 
The RIN is designed to address many different issues and shortcomings with the 
federal government’s current policy towards rural America. The RIN targets scarce 
resources to rural America so it can serve as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism. It 
creates a dedicated communications link between rural America and the Department of 
Homeland Security, thus allowing the Department’s message to get through to rural 
America. It serves to combat terrorists who are using rural America, a part of America 
particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack. It serves to bring relief to overwhelmed rural 
first responders, law enforcement, and firefighters, many of whom serve in multiple 
capacities at the same time. It serves to strengthen the U.S. border by reaching those rural 
border areas, and supplement current information collection and intelligence systems. 
Finally, the federal government can look toward Canada for effective models that 




1. Resources Are Scarce and Rural America Could Be a Force 
Multiplier in the War Against Terrorism 
If mobilized through targeted, effective education and training programs, rural 
Americans can be a great asset to DHS in preventing, mitigating, and recovering from 
disasters and terrorist events. “We need to increase preparedness by educating and 
mobilizing all Americans to participate in homeland security” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 153). 
Americans traditionally are self-reliant, yet altruistic. Rural survey respondents 
consistently value helping their neighbors, getting along, and working together to solve 
problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 17). DHS should put the 
powerful traditions of self-reliance and resiliency to work in the war against terrorism as 
“[s]elf-reliance, reinforced by mutual assistance, is a fundamental American virtue” 
(Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). “Strong traditions of self-reliance and individualism prevail in 
rural places, and they are coupled with very high levels of trust and civic engagement, 
particularly in the Heartland” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 4). 
However, Americans increasingly rely on the government to respond to the needs 
of victims of disasters or terrorist events. “By making homeland security a purely 
Washington affair, the Government was signaling that it would take responsibility for 
both security and response. Instead of promoting self-reliance, the government 
encouraged dependency” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 158). Americans, in general, are losing their 
ability to be self-reliant and take care of themselves. This places an unnecessary strain on 
the government’s preparation, response and mitigation systems for these events. A more 
prepared public relieves this pressure, as citizens are better able to defend themselves 
when confronted by terrorists or help themselves or others in times of disasters. Rural 
Americans understand that help may not be coming to them immediately after a disaster. 
“For those of us living in rural communities, it is especially important that we be 
prepared because community services are often limited and local responders—like police, 
fire personnel, and medical facilities—may be many miles away, or quickly overwhelmed 




“Public education is the first step toward strengthening ourselves. We need more 
than Homeland Security Web sites and Government Printing Office pamphlets; we need 
to aggressively educate the public through all media, in the classrooms, at town halls, in 
civic meetings, through professional organizations, and in volunteer groups” (Jenkins, 
2006, p. 158). However, the federal government’s main avenue of educating its citizens 
in disaster preparedness and terrorism events is through FEMA’s (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) Citizen Corps. While such training in first aid, disaster response 
and mitigation, and terror psychology is necessary, it is far from adequate for the war on 
terrorism. Citizen Corps, while serving as the umbrella organization for a number of 
different citizen engagement initiatives (USAonWatch/Neighborhood Watch, The Fire 
Corps, etc.) does not fill the leadership role of coordinating citizens in rural America for 
information gathering purposes. While Citizen Corps acknowledges, “we all have a role 
in hometown security,” few actual security measures and initiatives exist in most of its 
programs (The National Office of Citizen Corps–FEMA Community Preparedness 
Division). Most of its programs revolve around preparation, mitigation, response and 
recovery efforts related to natural disasters and terrorism. Citizen Corps asserts that there 
are currently 2,403 Councils that serve 225,985,904 people or 79 percent of the total U.S. 
population” (The National Office of Citizen Corps–FEMA Community Preparedness 
Division). However, Citizen Corps has no definition of “serve.” No matrix exists for 
measuring how 79 percent of the U.S. population is served. There is little to no drive to 
engage the public, let alone the rural public, in domestic information gathering efforts.  
The America government has tried to engage its public in prior information 
gathering efforts, most notably with Citizen Corps’ Operation TIPS in 2002. Concerns 
raised by Operation TIPS were many, ranging from lack of openness to lack of oversight 
(Cavoukian, 2003). Operation TIPS was doomed from the start as ill-marketed, and 
ultimately, unsupported by senior leaders in the administration. America still needs an 
effective means to engage its citizens, particularly in rural areas where resources and 




In the war on terror, America needs to combat a terrorist network (Al-Qaeda) with 
a similar network that understands how the terrorist network operates. America needs to 
engage its rural citizens directly as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism with a 
targeted, local relationship building effort. A system constructed with local people and 
assisted by conservation district staff can destroy the main reason that Operation TIPS 
failed—the central processing of the information collected. Rather than funneling 
information into one central depository, the information gathered from rural Americans 
can go through conservation districts, be used at that level and then go to state fusion 
centers for assessment. Only the most relevant and important information, as determined 
by requirements set in conjunction with the stakeholders, can go further; even then it is 
disseminated back to the collectors in the form of intelligence bulletins and products.  
FEMA claims that “[b]y participating in Citizen Corps programs, you can make 
your home, your neighborhood and your community a safer place to live” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2004, p. 3). While that is undoubtedly true, a little bit 
of training is not adequate against the global Islamist and domestic terrorism threat 
America faces today. America needs to combat radical Islamic ideology with its own core 
American ideology of freedom, self-reliance, due process, individual rights, greater good 
and the pursuit of happiness.  
FEMA assures the public that by passing the Citizen Corps training program, 
“credit can be provided to those who successfully complete the entire guide and score at 
least 75 percent on a final examination…. Those who pass the examination can expect to 
receive a certificate of completion….” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004, 
p. 4). This certification process may work well enough with first responders who need 
proof of training for employment purposes, but for the general public, it creates a mindset 
that all that is necessary is to pass the course to be prepared. It implies finality in 
preparation and knowledge about disasters and terror events. This undermines the 
training itself it is always necessary to seek new knowledge and information about how to 
be prepared and how to fight terrorism. It creates an instant gratification mindset that is 




terrorism. Rural Americans understand the long-term and delayed gratification to reap 
what is sown at the right time. Rural Americans have a better understanding of the 
timeframe of Islamic terrorists than their urban counterparts do. This understanding 
makes rural Americans better able to see the indicators and warnings posed by Islamic 
terrorists, and thus, can make them an effective counter-force to radicalization, 
recruitment, and operations of terrorists in rural America.  
In rural America, geographic size matters. It covers a much larger geographical 
area than urban areas. Even a conservative definition of rural America indicates that “17 
percent of the nation’s population… [are] living on 80 percent of the land” (Hamilton, 
Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 6). “In 2004, about 75 percent of the 4 million 
miles of public roads in the United States were in rural areas (those with fewer than 5,000 
residents)” (National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, 
2007). Not only is it large, private landowners own most of the land in rural America. 
“The land surface of the United States covers 2.3 billion acres. Private owners held 61 
percent in 2002, the federal Government 28 percent, state and local governments 9 
percent, and Indian reservations 3 percent. Virtually all cropland is privately owned, as is 
three-fifths of grassland pasture and range, and over half of forestland” (Amos Eno & 
Dyche, 2006, p. 1). The RIN creates the circumstances to allow DHS to obtain the 
cooperation necessary to access the 61 percent of lands in private ownership.  
Furthermore, rural America has unique needs that must be met by rural residents 
themselves. The differing geography, population fluctuations due to tourism, limited 
access to specialized equipment and resources (such as HAZMAT), international border 
boundaries, equipment shortages, staffing shortages, and communications all pose unique 
challenges to rural America (Strugar-Fritsch, 2003). Rural communities also have unique 
emergency management needs that typically do not exist in metropolitan areas. These 
include identification of property addresses for properties that encompass multiple acres; 
more than one structure on the property; storage of chemicals, fuels and pesticides in 
outbuildings; the presence of livestock and farm animals; and complex water and 




not be coming to them immediately after a disaster. “For those of us living in rural 
communities, it is especially important that we be prepared because community services 
are often limited and local responders—like police, fire personnel, and medical 
facilities—may be many miles away, or quickly overwhelmed by the scope of a major 
disaster” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 25). However, “[b]y definition, the 
fastest growing parts of rural America become part of the nation’s cities—a situation like 
a minor league team always losing its best players to the major leagues” (Drabenstott, 
2002, p. 2). This means that the best and brightest in rural America are at risk of moving 
into cities and metropolitan areas. This creates additional strain on rural areas. 
DHS is providing funding, ostensibly to rural America, but not necessarily to rural 
residents, and not at the same levels as their urban counterparts. For fiscal year 2007, 
DHS allocated a combined total of $182 million in cooperative and interagency 
agreements to design and deliver training programs to federal, state, local and tribal 
jurisdictions (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). “Training will be designed for 
and delivered to appropriate state and local personnel in emergency management, public 
health, clinical care, public works, public safety, the private sector, nonprofits, faith-
based, and community organizations” (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). 
However, also in fiscal year 2007, DHS allocated just $11.6 million for the same training 
in rural communities by creating a Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium (RDPC) 
through Eastern Kentucky University (Department of Homeland Security, 2007), which 
amounts to roughly $4.31 per rural resident (50 million rural residents). The RDPC is 
designed for rural first responder training. Grant funds are not allocated to rural citizens 
themselves, but only to first responders. While this is a good first step, more needs to be 
done. Gary Wingrove, Chair of the RDPC Advisory Board, indicates, “[o]ftentimes the 
training needs of rural America have taken a backseat to their urban counterparts” (Rural 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium, 2007). 
Even if funds are allocated to rural America, those funds must actually arrive to 
do any good. President Obama, during the 2008 election, claimed that since 2001, the 




program. Yet, “less than half of those funds have gone to truly rural areas. Instead, the 
USDA has awarded the bulk of these benefits to metropolitan regions, recreational and 
retirement communities, and businesses that hardly qualify as contributing to the quality 
of life in rural America” (Obama/Biden, 2008). “Federal funding should be aimed at 
improving local capacity” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 159). 
American attention to its rural citizens comes primarily through the Department of 
Agriculture’s Rural Development office, and the National Rural Development 
Partnership (NRDP). However, NRDP acknowledges the vision of coordinating 
American rural policy is “still unfulfilled” and even identifies Canada as a county that has 
“established structures to ensure that rural needs are considered when government 
policies and programs are developed” (National Rural Development Partnership, 2006). 
Funding continues to be a problem as Congress never fully funded the NRDP and the 
state councils that the NRDP uses to coordinate on a local level have fallen from a high of 
40 to just 35 state councils (National Rural Development Partnership, 2006, p. 8).  
2. The Department of Homeland Security’s Message Is Not Getting to 
Rural America  
Current disaster and terrorism-related educational programs designed to reach the 
rural population (Citizen Corps, Neighborhood Watch) are unsuccessful because they do 
not communicate effectively to this population. Rural Americans, generally, have an 
intense dislike and distrust of the federal government (J. Culp, personal communication, 
September 24, 2009). Further, they have an aversion to the use of technology, specifically 
the Internet, as a communication device. Rather, an “awful lot of information sharing 
takes place at the local coffee shop” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 
2009). State and federal agencies increasingly rely on the Internet as their primary means 
of public information dissemination, and as a result, communication with rural America 
is deteriorating. Further, for those who embrace new technology in rural American, they 






covered well with DSL, cable and fiber optics, rural areas are limited to Satellite Internet 
in most cases” (Thomason, 2009). As of September 2008, “[o]nly 38 percent of rural 
Americans have access to a high-speed Internet connection” (Depew, 2008).  
Web sites are not effective at building communication relationships between the 
federal government and rural citizens. Rural residents prefer communication through their 
established networks. In one study, over 60 percent of the participants reported that the 
Internet was the least used source for agricultural information, and that overall 
participants preferred to use magazines, neighbors, radio, and local Extension Services 
for information (Dollisso & Martin, 2001). Similarly, small and rural law enforcement 
agencies shun the Internet. “[L]ess than one-third of the [rural law enforcement] agencies 
reported that they maintain an official home page on the Internet” (Collins, 2004, p. 5). 
The Council for Excellence in Government conducted a survey in 2006 and asked 
Americans if they had heard of two national Web sites (Ready.gov and ReadyKids.gov). 
“Just sixteen percent of adults say they have heard about Ready.gov at the national level 
and 5 percent say they have heard of ReadyKids.gov” (Council for Excellence in 
Government, 2006, p. 8). Perhaps the most comprehensive gathering and request for 
information comes from the USDA’s census of agriculture (National Agriculture 
Statistics Service, 2009). The USDA, through the National Agriculture Statistics Service 
(NASS), conducts the census every five years, going back over 150 years to the 1840 
census. The census was conducted by mail the entire time. In 2007, NASS mailed the 
form to all farm and ranch operators, but for the first time, allowed for the survey of 
agriculture to be done by farmers on-line (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2007).  
Rural or farm usage of computers and the Internet continue to be significantly less 
than the average population. In 2003, 62 percent of households had personal computers 
and Internet access (Day, Janus, & Davis, 2005, p. 1), compared to just 39 percent of 
farmers (National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2002). Further, younger people continue 
to use the Internet more than older people do. The problem is that rural farmers are aging. 





of age. This average has been more than 50 years of age since at least the 1974 Census of 
Agriculture and has increased in each census since 1978—usually by one year or more 
from one census to the next” (Allen & Harris, 2005, p. 1).  
Privacy and the credibility of the government agency making contact with the 
rural population are also key elements in successful communication. If a governmental 
agency lacks credibility within the rural community, or is seen as wanting private 
information without a valid reason, the communication shuts down (McCarthy, Johnson, 
& Ott, 1999, p. 4). Similarly, in a survey conducted by the NASS to gauge farmers 
likelihood to respond to a government agencies request for information, the NASS found 
that “our data clearly shows a correlation between an individual’s likelihood of 
responding and their attitudes toward the specific government agency conducting the 
survey” (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 19). In other words, effective 
communication depends on which agency is doing the communicating. An agency with 
highly regulatory duties does not receive a warm welcome from rural communities. The 
solution that NASS found to address this problem was education. NASS created a 
training program specifically directed at farmers to educate them on the mission and 
benefit of interaction with NASS and its work (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 21). 
Outreach efforts in the NASS training program consisted of “letters, brochures, and 
additional personal contacts to develop rapport between interviewers and farm operators, 
and media advertisements” (McCarthy, Johnson, & Ott, 1999, p. 21). Internet Web sites 
were not on this list. Homeland security needs the same targeted approach to reach the 
rural American population.  
The 2003 Citizen Corps survey asked what would be the best way for an 
organization to provide information about disaster preparedness. In the national survey, 
regular mail was the most common response (41 percent), followed by television or radio 
(24 percent) and local newspaper (15 percent)—only 6 percent indicated that the Internet 





The problem of effective communication with rural communities needs creative 
solutions. As one state director of a health department noted that when a needs 
assessment was sent out to rural communities, it “wasn’t friendly to rural areas–it was a 
huge book of forms for people to fill out, and rural areas don’t really have staff that can 
do things like that” (Mueller, 2006, p. 13). DHS needs to establish an effective means of 
communication with rural America. 
3. Terrorists Are Using Rural America 
Part of the allure of rural America is, “like a complex sacred text or an abstract 
painting, rural America is open to interpretation. As a result, people as diverse as 
Jefferson, Thoreau, counter-culture commune builders, and the Aryan Nation have found 
inspiration there” (Danbom, 1997, pp. 17–18).  
Rural America is not ignored by terrorists. The 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) lists Al-Qaeda and other “single-issue” groups as an increasing threat to 
the American homeland over the next few years (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007). The NIE indicates that the IC will be challenged in how it “detects 
and disrupts plots,” and stresses that defensive efforts “will also require greater 
understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat 
information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of 
legitimate interactions” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The RIN 
is designed to help provide that greater understanding of activities at the local level.  
Further, the FBI considers eco-terrorism to be the number one domestic terrorism 
threat (Lewis, 2005, p. 18), and eco-terrorists are targeting rural America. Earth 
Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front attacks include targeting fur farmers, 
forestry services, federal land, meat packing plants, lumber facilities, and other rural 
locations (Lewis, 2005, p. 11). Eco-terrorists use a variety of tactics unheard of in urban 
areas, including animal releases, sabotaging construction equipment, tree spiking, pouring 
sand or sugar in gas tanks, and cutting hydraulic lines (Carson, 2005, p. 43). Further, 




activities in the sparsely populated rural areas. Examples include the Toronto 18, Portland 
Six, and the Northern Virginia Paintball cell (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). As DHS Secretary 
Napolitano has stated, “one of the things we need to do is communicate that unfortunately 
the terrorist threat is not just focused on New York City or Washington, D.C., or a few 
other urban areas. Indeed if you look at the last couple of weeks, arrests have been made 
in places like Minneapolis and North Carolina” (Napolitano, 2009).  
In a study authored by Brent Smith, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) found 
that “committing an act of terrorism will usually involve local preparations” (Smith, 
2008, p. 5). Further, “almost half (44 percent) of all terrorists examined lived within 30 






Figure 4.   Distance from Terrorist Residence to Target (All Groups). (From: Smith, 





An even greater percentage (51 percent) of environmental terrorists lives within 
30 miles of their targets (Smith, 2008, p. 4). Figure 5 illustrates this principle. This has 
great implications for eco-terrorism, which has already been noted to affect rural America 
inordinately and to be on the rise. The NIJ study acknowledged that much of the terrorist 
conduct is not necessarily criminal in nature, but “early intelligence may give law 
enforcement the opportunity to stop the terrorists before an incident occurs” (Smith, 






Figure 5.   Distance from Environmental Terrorist Residence to Target. (From: Smith, 




4. Rural America Is Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack 
According to the 2007 NIE, terrorists, and in particular Al-Qaeda, are “likely to 
continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the 
goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic 
aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population” (Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007). The main infrastructure target that exists in rural America is 
agriculture and food supply-related systems. President Bush’s Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) #9 recognizes that “America’s agriculture and food system 
is an extensive, open, interconnected, diverse, and complex structure providing potential 
targets for terrorist attacks” (Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9, 2004). 
The agriculture, livestock, and food infrastructure in America is increasingly seen as a 
target for terrorists. The Food and Drug Administration has “long understood that our 
public food and water supplies are among the most likely avenues for terrorist threats” 
(Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 3). Malicious and terrorist attacks using food as a delivery 
system have already occurred in the United States and abroad (Daniels & Coates, 2001, p. 
3). However, actual terrorist attacks are not necessary, just the threat of an attack is 
enough to cause panic and disrupt markets (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2001, p. 5). The 
agriculture/food/fiber production and processing industries are particularly vulnerable 
targets of bioterrorism (Bledsoe & Rasco, 2001, p. 6). Yet, while an alert farmer is the 
first line of defense against the spread of agricultural disease, that farmer “may hesitate to 
call animal health officials for fear his entire herd will be quarantined…” (Casagrande, 
2001, p. 10). 
5. Rural Law Enforcement Is Overwhelmed 
Local police forces are tasked with being the first line of defense against rural 
terrorist operations. “As with many other services, however, rural areas are severely 
constrained by the lack of law enforcement resources. In 1999, for example, 52.4 percent 
of all local law enforcement agencies employed less than 10 sworn personnel while 5.7 




Local police “are in the best position to monitor potential homegrown terrorists… 
[because] they know their territory” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 166). However, “[r]ural police are 
first responders to a wider variety of concerns than are urban police and consequently 
have additional channels for gathering information” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 10). 
Similarly, in some cases in remote communities, a conservation district’s responsibility 
“may move over into some activities that we would think of as more governmental that a 
county or a city or even a sheriff’s department may get engaged in” (M. Clark, personal 
communication, September 8, 2009). However, “out in the country, law enforcement 
takes a long time to get there” and the response may be limited (W. F. Hendrix, personal 
communication, October 5, 2009).  
Another area of increasing concern is gangs in rural areas. “Specifically, gangs 
were more likely to be reported in nonmetropolitan [rural] areas experiencing economic 
growth” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 4). Gangs, their affiliates, criminal networks and 
gang indoctrination methods are on the rise in rural areas. In one study, most rural 
jurisdictions reported that the majority of gang members are local youth. “However, in 
many jurisdictions the impact of imported gang members was substantially greater than 
their numbers alone would suggest, because they became an important conduit for the 
movement of ideas and symbols into these areas” (Weisheit & Wells, 2001, p. 8). This 
suggests that radicalization, as urban radicals and terrorists expanding into rural areas 
may influence a similar process to gang induction and membership rather than local rural 
people becoming gang members and radicalizing on a local level.  
The changing nature of rural America also brings with it other challenges for rural 
law enforcement. For instance, there is an influx of new immigrants into the rural 
population (Colnes, Grimm, Hattan, Stracuzzi, & Wyckoff-Baird, 2007, p. 4). These new 
immigrants are primarily Hispanics, but other groups are represented (e.g., Hmong). 
Integrating these new immigrants into rural America is essential to combating possible 
radicalization. If the new immigrants are alienated by their attempts to integrate into rural 
America, they are at higher risk for disaffection and radicalization by Islamic terrorist 




Not only does rural law enforcement suffer from a lack of resources, small 
departments and multiple mission demands, a “rural paradigm” exists that prevents rural 
departments from acknowledging possible terrorist activities in their area (The Council 
on State Governments, 2005, p. 23). The Council on State Governments found that “state 
officials face many unique challenges in working with local agencies in rural areas. The 
two most prevalent issues raised by state officials stem from this “rural paradigm.” Those 
issues include a lack of immediate concern by local law enforcement (“it can’t happen 
here”) and a lack of personnel and resources to participate in state-level efforts” (The 
Council on State Governments, 2005, p. 23).  
6. Rural Time Perspective 
In their book, The Time Paradox, Philip Zimbardo and John Boyd discuss the war 
on terrorism as “a war on time perspectives” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). They delineate 
two types of future time perspectives: mundane and transcendental. The mundane future 
goals are those that can be achieved in a person’s or society’s lifetime. On the other hand, 
“[t]he transcendental future time perspective extends from the death of the physical body 
to eternity” (Zimbardo, 2008, pp. 172-173). Zimbardo and Boyd posit that Germany and 
Japan were defeated in World War II “not by destroying people but by destroying 
people’s plans for the future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). By destroying both countries’ 
plans for world domination (mundane future goals), both lost their “motivation to fight 
and agreed to surrender” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183).  
In the war on terrorism, however, America’s primary adversary, Al-Qaeda, has 
hopes that “lie squarely in the transcendental-future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). 
Destroying the mundane future goals of Al-Qaeda “ensures that transcendental-future 
goals alone are obtainable” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 183). If the mundane future goals are 
destroyed, all that remains for Al-Qaeda is the transcendental future. So, “[w]hile the 
West looks to new strategies that can turn the tide of war next week, next month, or next 
year, this adversary plans for the distant future” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 184). Apparently 
recognizing this, John McCain famously said during the 2008 presidential campaign that 




training, recruiting and motivational efforts (Corley, 2008). “The West worries about 
troop level next year. Al-Qaeda worries about the next century” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 
184). Zimbardo and Boyd conclude this argument by asserting, “the war on terrorism is a 
battle between the United States government’s vision of the mundane future and the 
vision of the transcendental future held by those who are its enemies. Short-term victory 
is unlikely when the adversary is planning for eternity” (Zimbardo, 2008, p. 184).    
Al-Qaeda has repeatedly shown a much greater time perspective during the war 
on terrorism than the American government. The quintessential example of this is the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing by Ramzi Yousef, nephew of Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed, and the span of eight years between the September 11, 2001 attacks. In 
1998, Osama bin Laden declared war on America. Later that same year, the embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania are bombed, and in 2000, the U.S.S. Cole is bombed. In contrast, 
during the first Gulf War in 1990–1991, it took the U.S. just over six months to conduct 
that entire campaign. The main invasion of the 2003 Iraq war by U.S. forces took just 
over three months, notwithstanding ongoing efforts to rebuild the nation and pacify the 
insurgency.  
Rural America has a much longer time perspective than urban America, and in 
that regard, is similar in nature to Islamic fundamentalists. In a study conducted of 8,000 
rural Americans in the fall of 2007, over 70 percent of the respondents indicated that they 
had lived in rural America for more than 10 years (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & 
Colocousis, 2008). The study also found that “almost two-thirds of respondents in 
chronically poor [rural] counties said they have lived in the area for their entire lives” 
(Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008, p. 15). Moreover, 55 percent of 
respondents indicated that at least one parent grew up in that same area (Hamilton, 
Hamilton, Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Rural America’s largely agrarian, family 
oriented lifestyle lends itself to being the antithesis of modern, urban America.  
While “rural America tends to look backward instead of forward—at what it has 
lost instead of what it might gain” (Drabenstott, 2002, p. 2), this perspective can help the 




perspective as Islamic terrorists, and therefore, a better understanding of the mindset of 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorists than their urban counterparts. The unique understanding 
of time perspective that rural America has makes rural Americans better able to recognize 
the indicators and warnings posed by Islamic terrorists, and thus, can make them an 
effective counter-force to radicalization, recruitment efforts, and terrorist operations in 
rural America.  
In his book, From the Terrorist’s Point of View, Fathali Moghaddam asserts that a 
tension exists between globalization and local group identification among individuals 
(Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View, 2006, p. 30). Western cultures have 
had many more years to adapt to globalization changes than Eastern cultures and many 
Islamic nations (Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View, 2006, p. 30). This 
tension causes identity conflict and strife for individuals who cannot adapt quick enough, 
and leads to the path of terrorism (Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View, 2006, 
p. 30). This conflict is nowhere more evident in America than in rural America. Rural 
America is increasingly under pressure from global economic forces seeking to dominate 
local, rural identities. “Globalization is changing the rural economy; agriculture and low-
skilled manufacturing are no longer key drivers” (Hamilton, Hamilton, Duncan, & 
Colocousis, 2008, p. 3). As such, rural Americans have a unique understanding of the 
problems and forces at work that push individuals toward those first few steps in the 
“staircase to terrorism” (Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' Point of View, 2006). Rural 
Americans, much more than urban Americans, have an understanding of the same forces 
that push Islamic youth towards terrorism.  
“Too often, our understanding of terrorism is shaped by one frantic media event 
after another, all focused on short-term goals” (Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs 
Terrorism, 2008, p. preface X). The federal government should shift its focus in the war 
on terror from the short-term time perspective to a long-term time perspective. It should 
investigate the use of rural America in the war on terrorism to combat radicalization, 





understand why terrorist behave the way that they do” (Moghaddam, From the Terrorists' 
Point of View, 2006, p. 2), America should make use of all of its citizens as a resource in 
the war on terrorism, not just those in major urban centers.  
7. Current Information Collection and Intelligence Systems  
The primary means DHS uses to gather intelligence from the American public is 
through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). DHS touts HSIN as a 
“comprehensive, nationally secure and trusted Web-based platform able to facilitate 
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information sharing and collaboration between federal, 
state, local, tribal, private sector, and international partners” (Homeland Security 
Information Network, 2009). HSIN allows various levels of government and private 
industry to collaborate in major urban areas. It provides “real-time, interactive 
connectivity between states and major urban areas and the National Operations Center 
(NOC),” and has five major mission areas (Intelligence and Analysis, Law Enforcement, 
Emergency Management, Critical Sectors, and Multi-Mission Agencies) (Homeland 
Security Information Network, 2009). HSIN has an impressive list of capabilities, 
including: 24/7 availability; document libraries; instant-messaging tools; Web 
conferencing; incident reporting; situational awareness and analysis; geographical 
visualization; announcements; discussion boards; task lists; calendars; Really Simple 
Syndication (RSS) feeds; and online training materials (Homeland Security Information 
Network, 2009). HSIN also has a nomination process by which membership and access to 
the system is granted. DHS has further refined HSIN with creation of the Homeland 
Security State and Local IC of Interest (HSSLIC). The HSSLIC is a “structured, charter-
governed community of intelligence analysts at the federal, state and local level” which 
uses a restricted access virtual work area that is “protected by two-factor authentication 
and facilitates collaboration” (Homeland Security Information Network, 2009). 
HSIN was “[b]uilt to enable collaboration through the use of Web-based 
technology, HSIN facilitates collaboration among the various states, territories, the 
National Capital Region, and major urban areas” (Homeland Security Information 




interact with rural America, HSIN is too complicated and tries to be too many things for 
too many customers. HSIN’s nomination process may add some additional security to the 
system, but it also serves as a barrier for the collection of information from sources who 
might not want to become members. Those sources would have to be vetted and their 
information investigated under a system that does not have a membership requirement, 
but at least their information can be included in the collection process.  
The iCAV application is also part of the HSIN. iCAV stands for Integrated 
Common Analytical Viewer. It is a “secure, Web-based, geospatial visualization tool that 
integrates commercial and government-owned data and imagery from multiple sources.” 
iCAV allows users to view and analyze infrastructure data using a geographic 
information system. Access is granted through a username and password protocol. The 
iCAV system uses a special dataset (“HSIP Gold”) that contains information from the 18 
critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) sectors. The HSIP Gold dataset may be 








iCAV uses a special dataset from which its maps are derived. That dataset has a 
national focus and is limited to 18 sector-specific CIKR’s. The Homeland Infrastructure 
Foundation Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group manages that dataset. While the HIFLD 
asserts it was created to foster the development of infrastructure information across 
“multiple levels of government,” the HIFLD membership consists entirely of federal 
agencies (Welcome to the The Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD) 
Working Group). Further, HIFLD meetings “focus primarily on different national-level 
and defense critical infrastructure sectors…” and are not inclusive in state or local 
participation as “parallel sessions and communications at SECRET or higher 
[information classification] levels are conducted as necessary” (Welcome to the The 
Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD) Working Group).  
In 2005, it was noted that “[i]ntelligence support to the homeland security 
community below the federal level is largely non-existent due to classification issues” 
(Jardines, 2005, p. 12). In 2008, security clearances still posed problems for the FBI, 
DHS, and state and local law enforcement (Eack, 2008). In 2010, reducing the amount of 
classified intelligence is a work in progress, and there is currently at least one bill before 
Congress (H.R. 553) addressing this issue (GovTrack, 2009). The RIN can eliminate this 
problem by collecting voluntary, open-source information. The RIN can focus more on 
local issues and information and encompass the collection of information not only on 
CIKR, but also on terrorists themselves. It also does not discourage local participant as it 
can be designed specifically for the use of local government and private entities.  
iCAV is also integrated with C/ACAMS. C/ACAMS is the 
Constellation/Automated Critical Asset Management System. It is directed at state and 
local first responders and allows them to map their own data, as well as to develop their 
own response and recovery plans based off the CIKR data they collect or is provided to 
them. Access to C/ACAMS is through a password-protected protocol after initial training 
by first responders in the use of the system. Data used by C/ACAMS is exempt from 





Figure 7.   C/ACAMS Screen Shot. (From: Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
C/ACAMS is the most promising program to perhaps modify or integrate with the 
RIN. It has information privacy protocols to protect the disclosure of information 
provided to it for use in making CIKR protection plans. Protecting privacy is a high 
priority for rural Americans. While C/ACAMS allows for rural first responders to create 
their own plans, it does not allow private landowners or others access to do so without 
some sort of documented CIKR homeland security responsibilities. Another obstacle is 
the higher level of training required to use C/ACAMS due to the self-service nature of 
plan creation.  
DHS also publishes a “Department of Homeland Security Daily Open Source 
Infrastructure Report” (DHS Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report, 2009). The Report 
is a daily summary of “open-source published information concerning significant critical 
infrastructure issues. Each Daily Report is divided by the critical infrastructure sectors 
and key assets defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan” (DHS Daily Open 
Source Infrastructure Report, 2009). However, the DHS Daily Report has little to no 
intelligence analysis published in the report, no connection to the articles analyzed in the 
report to current possible terrorist threats, nor analysis of the information itself for trends, 
indicators or warning intelligence. Further, the Daily Report is organized by 
infrastructure type/sector, rather than on any geographic or regional boundary. While this 




or geographic threats or intelligence that might exist. Other knowledge management 
systems outside of DHS exist (see the U.S. Coast Guard’s Citizen Action Network 
(CAN)), but further research is necessary.  
The current selection of DHS information collection and intelligence systems is 
inadequate to meet the needs of the asymmetric domestic terrorism threat in rural 
America. A database system that allows information to be pushed in from various sources 
(individuals, landowners) to a central point for analysis and that could pull information 
from those sources can be both flexible and unobtrusive. By focusing on just two 
different but complementary areas of knowledge management, the RIN can be easy to 
manage and use. 
8. Lessons Learned from Canada 
Canada has created a unique model for interaction with its rural population, and 
America should adopt this model. America should adopt the Canadian model of focused 
attention and interaction with its rural citizens for use in domestic information gathering 
efforts in the war on terrorism.  
Brian Jenkins’ statement, “[t]he federal government does not provide homeland 
security. Citizens do” (Jenkins, 2006, p. 157), applies equally well to the Canadian 
government as to the American government. The Canadian government understands that 
statement, but the American government does not. America, through its DHS and the IC, 
has largely ignored its citizens, especially in rural America, in the fight against domestic 
terrorism. The war on terrorism requires the IC to employ new methods of information 
collection and to alter its information sharing and collecting paradigm. Rural America is 
an ever-increasing battleground in the war on terrorism, and the IC must find new 







Both America and Canada have large rural areas. The vast majority of land in 
Canada is considered rural. Similar to America, any land not classified “urban” in Canada 
is typically defined as “rural.” (Mendoza & Johnson, 2009). In Canada, 32 percent of the 
33 million in total population live in non-urban areas, or about 10.5 million people 
(Statistics Canada, 2009).  
Similar to America, rural areas in Canada are used and targeted by terrorists. 
“Eco-terrorist strikes against the Canadian oil industry were the country’s most notable 
terrorist incidents in 2008” (Gartenstein-Ross, Goodman, & Grossman, 2009, p. 16). 
Through 2008 and mid-2009, six terrorist bombings of EnCana facilities occurred near 
the small, rural community of Tomslake, on the border of British Columbia and Alberta 
near Dawson Creek, B.C., about 560 kilometers northwest of Edmonton (Stolte, 2009). A 
map created anonymously on the Internet (Figure 8) shows the locations of the last 
bombing near the Tomslake community (Energetic, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 8.   Anonymous map of EnCana Bombings. (From: Energetic, 2009). 
On January 8, 2010, Royal Canadian Mounted Police were able to arrest the 
suspected bomber, an Eco-terrorist convicted in attacking EnCana predecessor Alberta 
Energy Company facilities (EnCana’s predecessor) in the 1990’s (Jones, 2010). The rapid 




for violent acts in response (Flanagan, 2009). Groups operating in rural Canada that 
might choose violence in response to increased resource extraction include “individual 
saboteurs, eco-terrorists, mainstream environmentalists, First Nations, and the Métis 
people” (Flanagan, 2009, p. 1). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has 
also identified the desire to move to, and operate in, rural areas as a characteristic of 
Canadian “Doomsday Religious Movements,” providing further evidence that more than 
one type of terrorist organization finds rural Canada attractive (Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, 1999). Further, Bill Hubble, Deputy Director General of the 
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada said in 2006, “we don't know what we don't know” 
with regard to the extent of organized crime in rural Canada (Ghoreishi & Drukier, 2006).  
“Many Canadians may be surprised to learn that, with the exception of the United 
States, there are more terrorist groups active in Canada today than in any other country in 
the world” (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2008). Considering the length of the 
U.S.–Canadian border, “approximately 3,987 miles,” (Beaver, 2006), this is a sobering 
fact. The NIE lists “Islamic terrorist groups and cells” as America’s most persistent 
threat, but does not quantify the number of terrorist groups operating in the United States 
(Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2007). The United States Department of 
State only keeps a list of designated “foreign terrorist organizations,” and puts that 
number at forty-five (U.S. Department of State, 2010). The Canadian Intelligence 
Community (CIC) clearly understands that the Canadian homeland is threatened by 
domestic and international terrorism. Before September 11, “Canada had a relatively 
modest security and intelligence community, with no stand-alone foreign intelligence 
service” (Purdy, 2007, p. 106). “Security and terrorism were not top issues in Canada 
prior to 9/11” (Purdy, 2007, p. 108). While Canada has not suffered terrorist attacks to the 
same degree as America with regard to September 11, the CIC recognizes that “the 
absence of violence here at home does not mean the absence of terrorist activity” 
(Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2008). Indeed, the second core national security 
interest for Canada is “ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies” (The Privy 




The IC in both Canada and the United States is very similar in its organization—a 
number of different state agencies exist that have control over different aspects of the 
intelligence process. Those agencies conduct operations and gather information to report 
to their agency heads who, in turn, report to ministers and directors at higher levels in the 
IC. What is dissimilar is the posture that the Canadians have versus the Americans with 
regard to those outside the IC—the ordinary citizens—particularly those far from the 
urban centers of political, economic and social power in Canada. The Canadians have 
actively engaged those more rural members of its society in the intelligence process 
through its Rural Secretariat and the Rural Lens concept, described in detail below.  
Similar to America, the Canadian IC “mandates and activities were not well 
understood among the general population” (Purdy, 2007, p. 108). It was only after 
September 11 that the Canadian IC realized the connection between terrorism and 
economic performance, causing it to draw “new, nontraditional players (business leaders, 
economic think-tanks, provincial governments, and others) into the national dialog on 
terrorism and security” (Purdy, 2007, pp. 108-109). While “concern about terrorism has 
slipped” (Purdy, 2007, p. 110) in recent Canadian polls, “a deeply embedded security 
ethic is now a fundamental feature of contemporary Canadian and U.S. outlooks” 
(Graves, 2005, p. 12). 
Today, the Canadian Security Intelligence Cycle (see Figure 9) includes a role for 
average citizens to play in the collection of information in partnership with the Canadian 
IC. “Information from members of the public” is the first type of information collection 
listed by the CSIS in its outline of the Canadian intelligence cycle (Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, 2004). The Canadian IC clearly values the input of the ordinary 
citizen in its information gathering efforts. However, Canadian citizens are still 
encouraged, similar to their American counterparts, to report by telephone, e-mail, or 






Figure 9.   The Canadian Security Intelligence Cycle. (From: Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, 2004).  
In 1998, Canada created the Rural Secretariat (RS) in response to concerns that 
the government was not responding to rural issues and challenges (The Rural Secretariat, 
2008). Unlike Rural Development, America’s counterpart in the Department of 
Agriculture, the Canadian RS goes beyond coordinating just agriculture-related 
initiatives. It works in partnership, not only with other federal agencies, but also with 
private groups and non-governmental organizations to assist with any need a rural 
Canadian community might have, including knowledge building, policy development and 
strategies, and information sharing (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). Canada, rather than 
having just one agency primarily responsible for reaching out to the rural Canadians, 
combines a whole host of agencies together to form a Rural Development Network 
(RDN). The RDN “is made up of over 200 members representing 28 federal departments 





More importantly, Canada has created a framework from which it tasks its 
governmental agencies and partners to look at rural Canada–The Rural Lens (RL). The 
RL is “a way of viewing issues through the eyes of rural Canadians and raising awareness 
of these issues across all federal departments” (The Rural Secretariat, 2009). By looking 
through this RL, the Canadian government seeks to ensure that “rural issues and concerns 
are considered in the design and the delivery of federal policies and programs” (The 
Rural Secretariat, 2009). 
Moreover, to effectuate the insight gained by using the RL, Canada has created 
Rural Teams in each province and territory to build partnerships and create networks and 
alliances on a local level (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). These Rural Teams are comprised 
of “representatives from different levels of government and key stakeholders” in rural 
areas (The Rural Secretariat, 2008). Not only does the Canadian government recognize 
the importance of local-level relationships in building solid partnerships between all 
levels of government, it has acted upon that vision with the creation of the Rural Teams. 
The Rural Teams work to create a relationship between the Canadian government and its 
rural citizens by establishing regular, familiar and trusted interaction and communications 
channels. Rural Teams help to eliminate the “us” versus “them” dynamic that often exists 
between local citizens and federal government.  
Also, as part of its RS, Canada has targeted “information outreach” that includes 
not only electronic media, but also print media as well (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 15). 
This is important because Canada’s population is aging, (Statistics Canada, 2009) and 
studies show that younger Canadians use electronic media more than older Canadians do 
(Statistics Canada, 2009). Yet, Canada’s main communicate effort with its citizens, both 
urban and rural, increasingly is the Internet. This is parallel to what is happening in 
America. The Internet has substantial advantages to getting the message out to citizens, 
but rural citizens in both America and Canada do not use it for accessing government 
materials in nearly the same numbers that use the Internet for other purposes (Statistics 




Contrary to Canada’s targeted communications campaign, critics point to the 
“fractured” nature of American rural policy, and a “lack of clear focus” with programs 
and objectives being too spread out to be effective (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 16). 
“Clearly, Congress needs to better target U.S. RD programs if it wants to achieve success 
for the broader rural population” (Partridge & Olfert, 2008, p. 17).  
Another important area for effective governmental coordination with the private 
sector is in infrastructure protection. By actively partnering with locals on private lands, 
the IC can gain access to a good portion of the critical infrastructure held in private hands 
today. It is commonly understood that 85 percent of American infrastructure is owned 
and operated by the private sector. In an extraordinary coincidence, 85 percent of the 
critical infrastructure in Canada is owned or operated by the private sector in Canada 
(Information Sharing and Protection Under the Emergency Management Act, 2007). 
What is needed is a way to communicate and mobilize those who own 85 percent of 
critical infrastructure effectively in rural America and rural Canada.  
To meet that need in Canada, the Canadians have created an Office of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). To fulfill its mission to 
protect critical infrastructure, the OCIPEP seeks to share information with the security, 
intelligence, and private sector that owns the critical infrastructure. “Close cooperation 
and information sharing” are essential to this relationship (The Privy Council Office, 
2001, p. 10). The OCIPEP actively engages the private sector in its efforts—not only 
those in urban centers, but also in rural areas.  
D. OPERATION OF THE RURAL INFORMATION NETWORK 
Who is watching a landowner’s property? Well, it’s the landowner 
themselves. 
(M. Tobin, personal communication, September 24, 2009) 
 
The RIN operates by making individuals, private landowners and rural Americans 
aware of the terrorist threat in their area, communicating what they see and hear to a local 




and product dissemination. Participation in the RIN is voluntary, and a marketing 
campaign raises the awareness of the RIN and its relationship with Districts. Direct one-
on-one conservation district staff and supervisor contact could accomplish this with local 
rural residents. In addition, other traditional sources of communication media can also be 
used (i.e., newsletters, meetings, workshops, etc.). It is important to have private 
landowners, farmers and ranchers involved because they are “in the field.” They know 
their lands and communities best, and they can collect information with little or no 
training. In addition, these rural landowners frequently have close contacts already 
established with their local conservation district staff and supervisors. The RIN can also 
have protections similar to those already established in the Protected Critical 
Infrastructure Information (PCII) program to alleviate any fear of disclosure of critical 
infrastructure or key resource information. This type of structure protects information 
from public disclosure. Policies and procedures can be created to handle any information 
supplied by those individuals, landowners, farmers and ranchers to protect information 
deemed critical or sensitive while still preserving an information-sharing environment. 
Once private landowners and rural residents agree to participate in the RIN, and 
after they are trained, they next concentrate on supplying and gathering information to the 
conservation districts. The fusion center and stakeholders involved in the intelligence 
gathering process set requirements. Information that gathered can include information on 
possible terrorist activities and past/current operations and indicators. Rather than just 
having a one way flow of information up from landowners in the field to the fusion 
center, rural landowners can be given the option to disclose to conservation districts 
information on hazardous materials, dangerous conditions, critical infrastructure or key 
resources that might be on their land. This information stays at the local level (at the 
conservation district), to be used by local first responders in times of disasters or 
emergencies. Landowners benefit by having quicker response times and local first 





This kind of reciprocal communication model serves to establish a trust 
relationship between the rural landowners and the fusion center. Instead of a traditional 
bottoms-up communications model, this model allows a true communications exchange 
to occur. Figure 10 illustrates this communications information flow model.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Diagram of Information Flow within the RIN.  
Landowners would report suspicious circumstances and other information to their 
local conservation district staff and supervisors through any means with which they are 
comfortable, be that face-to-face communication, telephone calls, e-mail, or other means 
of communication. Conservation district staff are also “in the field” on a regular basis. 
They know their communities, the landscape and the critical infrastructure and key 
resources that populate it. They can be trained information collection and RIN database 
management. They are already trained in some elements of information gathering and 
collection, typically, as it relates to natural resource conservation. This includes the 
interpretation of satellite imagery, GIS data (collection / interpretation), and sensor data 
(collection/interpretation). A formalized training program in information gathering 
techniques can augment this knowledge.  
Once the information is collected, conservation district staff inputs that 
information into a secure database at the conservation district. This database can be 
complex or simple, as well as being with other systems, such as the state fusion center 




the information is transmitted to the state fusion center for analysis, and  processed and 
used by trained fusion center analysts. The analysts then can produce reports (similar to 
N.Y.P.D.’s S.H.I.E.L.D.) for distribution to DHS and to state and local customers (with 
appropriate tear lines). Appendix C contains an example of such a report. The critical 
infrastructure and key resource information remains at the conservation district for use by 
local incident commanders when responding to disasters and emergencies. Essentially, 
therefore, two types of information are collected: operational and tactical. Examples of 
operational information include congregations of vehicles or persons at the end of back 
roads, piles of shell casings or other materials, and the heavy or new use of roads or trails. 
Examples of tactical information might include locations of propane tanks, ammonium 
nitrate, anhydrous ammonia tanks, fertilizer storage facilities, water pumping 
infrastructure, explosives, heavy equipment, livestock, ingress/egress routes, shelter 
(homes, barns/outbuildings), and communications infrastructure.  
After collection, the information is transmitted to state fusion centers for analysis. 
Once that information is processed, it can be disseminated through products of the fusion 
center. The fusion center can employ dissemination to allow information to be 
disseminated in a way not necessitating the time-consuming effort to obtain security 
clearances for the staff and supervisors of the conservation districts. Thus, the need to 
obtain costly and time-consuming security clearances before practitioners in the field can 
use the intelligence is eliminated (i.e., local law enforcement, private sector infrastructure 
security officers, and others).  
Figure 11 graphically illustrates the RIN and its connections. The RIN allows for 
multiple inputs into the information stream to be made by landowners, ranchers, 
producers, and conservation district staff and supervisors. Information in the RIN flows 
vertically and horizontally, meaning that information about suspicious activities and other 
types of incidents flows into the system from landowners, ranchers, producers, and 
conservation district staff and supervisors. To effectuate a useful communications model, 
the communication are not just be vertical; from those on the fringes of the network (the 




flows down from the fusion center to those out in the field by way or reports, bulletins, 
and other products that the fusion center creates. In this way, an exchange of information 
rather than a one-way flow of information exists. This creates the necessary dynamic for 
effective communication to occur and establishes the relationship that allows for the flow 
of information and the development of trust.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Diagram of the RIN Connections.  
The RIN allows the exchange of information between rural public/landowners and 
the government on a voluntary basis, using a trusted, known division of the local 
government. The federal government will not create this for rural America (as is HSIN, 
C/ACAMS, iCAV, etc.), but will be created in partnership with, and largely by, rural 
America, which creates “buy-in” by the locals and increase the development of trust in 
the system. The RIN does not create any new significant structure, yet it educates rural 
America about rudimentary information collection methods, empowers conservation 
district staff members through specific, targeted training, and allows conservation 
districts to continue to generate and maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with 




E. CONSERVATION DISTRICTS 
1. Definition and Purpose 
Conservation districts were born out of the dust bowl environmental disaster of 
the 1930s. The U.S. government recognized at that time that “soil conservation was 
central to the longevity of any civilization” and in particular, American civilization 
(Montgomery, 2007, p. 6), so it fostered the development of conservation districts at the 
local level. They have evolved over time, but most retain their original purpose to 
conservation soil and water. Districts serve as nodes in a nationwide system of local 
government agencies responsible for assisting local landowners in natural resource 
conservation. This structure is the network of over 2,946 conservation districts and 
approximately 15,000 men and women who serve on their governing boards (National 
Assocation of Conservation Districts). Districts are local units of government established 
under state laws to execute natural resource management programs at the local level 
(National Assocation of Conservation Districts). Districts are familiar to and readily 
accessible by rural Americans, which can easily be utilized to communicate with and 
gather information from rural Americans. Districts work with millions of cooperating 
landowners and operators to help them manage and protect land and water resources on 
all private lands and many public lands in the United States (National Assocation of 
Conservation Districts). Districts “share a single mission: to coordinate assistance from 
all available sources—public and private, local, state and federal–in an effort to develop 
locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns” (Sims, 2007). Conservation 
districts are already involved in a number of programs concerning disaster preparedness 
and mitigation, have technical expertise to operate in rural areas, and are trusted and 
respected by members of rural America (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).  
2. Operations 
Conservation districts work “directly with more than 2.3 million cooperating land 
managers nationwide. Their efforts touch more than 1.5 billion acres of private forest, 




country—urban, rural, row crop farmers, ranchers, forestland owners and specialty crop 
producers on the plains, in the hills and on both coasts - so we know that no one program, 
practice, or policy will work for everyone” (Sims, 2007). Districts work in conjunction 
with other local, state and federal governmental agencies to “support voluntary, 
incentive-based programs that present a range of options, providing both financial and 
technical assistance to guide landowners in the adoption of conservation practices, 
improving soil, air and water quality and providing habitat and enhanced land 
management” (Sims, 2007, p. 1). 
Conservation districts are already involved in a number of programs concerning 
disaster preparedness and mitigation. They have the technical experience to be able to 
locate properties in flood plains and at risk for flooding, properties prone to wildfire 
damage due to improper foliage, and land subject to landslide and mudslides. Their 
technical expertise extends to understanding the needs of livestock ranchers, dairy 
operators, and crop growers. Districts have technical expertise that applies in many all-
hazards scenarios related to planning, mitigating, and responding to disasters and terror 
events. Staff members are familiar with a variety of high tech equipment including 
Global Positioning System (GPS) units, remote sensing, satellite imagery interpretation, 
and Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping.  
Districts also have a working knowledge of the local regions they serve—not only 
of the people there, but the land itself. This is synonymous with local law enforcement in 
large metropolitan areas knowing their particular block or “beat.” They know all the 
operators and can identify those persons and events that are out of place. While local law 
enforcement in rural areas also has this ability, typically it is not staffed to the level 
necessary to provide comprehensive coverage for the local area. Conservation districts, 
while also not having large staffs, have an extensive network of supervisors, employees, 
volunteers, and other contacts throughout the countryside that they can access. Their 
network is not formalized, but rather based on personal relationships and contacts, and is 
built on trust and confidence, rather than regulations and governmental directives. It is 




Conservation districts have experience working with multiple local, state, federal 
and tribal agencies. They are experienced at handling government grants, cost share 
requirements, and the documentation necessary for grant purposes. Districts frequently 
take the lead in bringing together diverse governmental entities, community 
organizations, and individuals into formal agreements for mutual aid and support in times 
of disaster or for other purposes. They create their own resources and information guides 
tailored to their own community’s needs. The Phoenix Guide (see Figure 12) is an 
example of a disaster and emergency manual that the Jefferson Conservation District in 
Colorado created for local use.  
Districts have technical expertise applicable to many all-hazards scenarios related 
to planning, mitigating, and responding to disasters and terror events. They have 
knowledge of local customs, norms, and political mechanizations. They are not 
regulatory, so there is no judgment, just aid and direction. Districts espouse the best of 
what America is—local people helping one another. Further, “local groups, such as 
conservation districts, who are close to the disaster and aware of local needs, have great 
credibility with funding organizations and with donors. Local groups, with established 
community partnerships, will often be asked by funding organizations to sponsor 
recovery efforts” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 59). 
 
 




Districts have the technical expertise to prepare for unique disaster management 
issues. John Cline indicated in his paper that a terrorist attack on the nation’s food supply, 
specifically livestock, would necessitate the burial and disposal of thousands of animal 
carcasses. His suggestion is to have “state and locally generated maps and pre-approved 
burial sites would aid in the speed of the disposal process” (Cline, 2005, p. 39). This 
knowledge of suitable burial sites is easily within the technical expertise of conservation 
districts. Further, Cline stresses that the “single most gaping hole in U.S. biosecurity is 
not within large complexes of the livestock industry. Rather, biosecurity vulnerabilities 
loom largest on the properties of the weekend farmer and the single-animal producer” 
(Cline, 2005, p. 41). Cline asserts that small farm operators might view biosecurity 
measures as too much work with which to comply (Cline, 2005, p. 41). However, this 
attitude is precisely what conservation districts work against on a daily basis when they 
work with landowners to comply with other federal USDA and National Resources 
Conservation Services (NRCS) programs. Conservation districts are able to effectuate 
compliance because they are assisting landowners in understanding the need for the 
regulation and the benefit of compliance.  
Conservation districts, in partnership with the National Resource Conservation 
Service (NRCS), can draw upon a huge number of volunteers through the Earth Team 
volunteer program. “The Earth Team, the volunteer arm of the USDA NRCS, recruits 
volunteers in more than 2,946 locations across the country. Anyone 14 years of age or 
older can join the Earth Team. Volunteers can work outdoors or in a local office. 
Individuals or groups can donate time as a volunteer” (Jefferson Conservation District, 
2006, p. 67). “The NRCS and conservation districts have benefited from the service of 
more than 300,000 volunteers who have contributed more than 10 million hours of 
service, valued at more than $167.2 million” (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 
67). The NRCS provides the training and insurance coverage, as well as travel and 
equipment costs for the volunteers (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006, p. 67). The 
conservation district and NRCS conducts a needs assessment to determine if volunteers 





can be addressed with volunteer agreements and reliance on the federal Volunteer 
Protection Act of 1997 for nonprofit organizations and state legislation related to 
volunteers and insurance. 
Conservation districts are also keenly aware of the local politics and issues that 
play important roles is bridging the gap between effective communication and a message 
that is not communicated. They are the non-regulatory repository of political knowledge 
and will in their areas. If they cannot do a particular task, they know to who to go in the 
community to get it done. Districts are frequently called upon to be an intermediary 
between the government, public, and local landowners and producers. They provide 
public hearings on rural land issues, and conduct mediations of disputes in rural areas, as 
well as a neutral forum for vetting of issues raised by the communities in which they are 
located (Sims, 2007, p. 6).  
“Conservation districts, government agencies, and community organizations all 
play critical roles in disaster recovery. However, ultimately, community recovery falls to 
the people living in the community where the disaster hit” (Jefferson Conservation 
District, 2006, p. 33). While “[e]ach state may take a different approach… there is a 
consistent theme [among conservation districts] of working with landowners, providing 
technical assistance, financial assistance and expertise to help them make changes to their 
operations, or alter practices that… [are] critical to… [their] success” (Sims, 2007, p. 6). 
3. Conservation Districts and Trust 
Simply put, trust means confidence. The opposite of trust–distrust–is 
suspicion. When you trust people, you have confidence in them–in their 
integrity and in their abilities. When you distrust people, you are 
suspicious of them–of their integrity, their agenda, their capabilities, or 
their track record. It’s that simple. 
(Covey, 2006, p. 5). 
 
In early 2001, Washington State was in the grips of a devastating drought. By 
mid-summer, the drought was the second worst on record, second only to the 1977 




Not only was the state’s agriculture industry threatened, salmon stocks were hard hit, and 
hydro-energy production and drinking water supplies were in jeopardy. The Columbia 
River, the second largest river in the continental United States, flows through the heart of 
Eastern Washington. However, due to the then-current management practices and western 
water law obligations, the Columbia River was of little help in this crisis.  
In response, the Washington State Legislature, and the Washington State 
Department of Ecology (Ecology) began efforts to create legislation to address water 
shortages in Eastern Washington. Over five years later, a compromise was reached to 
allow Ecology, under existing water law, to search for new sources of water in Eastern 
Washington to alleviate drought in the future (Washington State Legislature, 2006).  
One of Ecology’s first actions was to determine if any conservation projects could 
be done to save water. Ecology had just four months to return an answer back to the 
Legislature, and Ecology turned to conservation districts for the answer. Twenty-nine 
conservation districts along the Columbia River in Eastern Washington qualified for 
water conservation projects under the new program. The districts, working with the local 
farmers, ranchers and landowners, were very aware of the overwhelming effects of the 
2001 drought and eager to assist in this effort. In just over one-month’s time, the districts 
identified 5,293 potential on-farm water conservation projects (Washington State 
Department of Ecology, 2007). 
Districts were able to identify so many potential projects because of their 
relationship with the landowners, ranchers and farmers in their local areas. “Conservation 
Districts are all about relationships” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 
2009). They knew where the opportunities were because of their prior contacts, meetings, 
and interactions with those landowners. “If natural resources need managing and there is 
a nexus with private landowners, the one agency that has the relationships on the ground 
with private landowners is the conservation districts” (S. Trefry, personal 
communication, September 8, 2009). The districts, because of the relationships created 
based on their interaction with the landowners in the past, had something that gave them 




The districts had worked with these landowners in the past on other natural 
resource conservation projects and had gained their trust. “In order to gain trust, you have 
to be able to have a coffee shop talk with people. And those kinds of talks with 
landowners are a little bit more prevalent since 9/11” (M. Tobin, personal 
communication, September 24, 2009). The landowners knew that they could trust district 
staff to help them with their projects on their land without subjecting them to regulatory 
oversight or penalties. “The staff ends up being pretty good friends with the people they 
are dealing with over time” (W. F. Hendrix, personal communication, October 5, 2009). 
The districts knew that if they could provide non-regulatory assistance to landowners, 
they could generate trust. “The districts are always real careful about being seen as being 
too close to any enforcement agency because they want to maintain the good technical 
assistance relationship. They are very protective of their non-regulatory role” (S. Trefry, 
personal communication, September 8, 2009).  
The landowners knew that Ecology was a state regulatory agency with the power 
to impose fines and other legal penalties for not following their directives. Ecology knew 
this as well. Some call this “regulatory mitigation” (J. Culp, personal communication, 
September 24, 2009). It is the Districts’ ability to keep its constituents from being 
regulated against in a negative manner (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 
2009). “Oftentimes the regulatory entity will provide the large stick and the carrot but 
they don’t know how to do the carrot part, so they contract with the conservation district 
to provide the carrot to stay away from the stick” (J. Culp, personal communication, 
September 24, 2009). Districts insert themselves “as the middle man so that the 
regulatory guy doesn’t have to do his job” (M. Tobin, personal communication, 
September 24, 2009). Ecology could not go directly to the landowners with their offer of 
financing in exchange for water conservation due to the lack of trust and confidence that 
landowners had that Ecology would not use their regulatory power against them. 
However, those same landowners knew that if their local conservation district were 
assisting them, they would be able to work with them free from regulatory oversight. The 
success that came with identifying so many water conservation projects came because of 




that they are actually there to help; and to keep them out of trouble, to keep them farming, 
to keep them actively engaged in private property management instead of putting 
restrictions on them” (W. F. Hendrix, personal communication, October 5, 2009).  
Conservation Districts provide that vital link between governmental agencies and 
private citizens in rural areas. They do this through “one-on-one interface with other 
agency staff, meetings in offices, meetings out on the ground, trying to marry up the 
concerns on the ground with the perspective of the regulatory agency or funding agency” 
(J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Typically, the end product of 
these efforts is a “more informed landowner, a protected natural resource, and a happy 
funding agency” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009).  
Further, because of the credibility that districts have built with the citizens they 
serve, the dissemination of homeland security related issues and information can be 
enhanced. “Private landowners, I think, would have a higher belief [in homeland security 
information and issues] from those Conservation District folks because they are people 
that they work with all the time in understanding this is a real concern verses someone 
else that they are not familiar with trying to tell them it’s a real concern” (M. Clark, 
personal communication, September 8, 2009). The familiarity and relationships that the 
districts have built over the years serves to lend credibility to their message.  
Additionally, in rural areas, districts are intimately connected to their 
communities. “In very rural areas, we may have some of the landowners involved with 
the District [that] may also be the volunteer firefighter or part-time deputy or whatever 
else in the county or city” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 8, 2009). In 
some cases in remote communities, a district’s responsibility “may move over into some 
activities that we would think of as more governmental that a county or a city or even a 
sheriff’s department may get engaged in” (M. Clark, personal communication, September 
8, 2009). This may be because in those areas, “most people’s relationship with the 
Sheriff’s Department isn’t a positive one” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 
24, 2009), but it also can be the result of familiarity. Each community is different, and 




and therefore do not like to move into the regulatory realm (S. Trefry, personal 
communication, September 8, 2009). Once a district moves “past the non-regulatory 
realm, with whether it is serving landowners through conservation or assisting in 
homeland security, when we go to regulation we will no longer be effective” (M. Tobin, 
personal communication, September 24, 2009). The “trust factor is a sacred one and hard 
to gain back if you ever lose it” (R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 
2009).  
Of course, no matter the amount of effort, some citizens are not going to be able 
to be reached due to a lack of trust. “People are really leery about government, even about 
the conservation Districts in places. There are people out there who don’t even trust 
them... there will be a percentage of the population out there that might not be reachable” 
(J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). In the March/April 2009 issue of 
the Journal of Emergency Management, Bjorn Kruke examines the issue of trust and 
humanitarian aid in Darfur. In his study, he identifies the cycle that distrust creates 
between lack of trust and reduced information exchange (Figure 13) (Kruke, 2009, p. 34). 
 
Figure 13.   Diagram of “Cycle of Distrust.” (From: Kruke, 2009, p. 34). 
Distrust breeds reduced information exchange. This then creates more distrust, 
which leads to less information exchange. Kruke summarized his findings into three 
areas: (1) mutual dependency motivates the parties to seek trust relations; (2) trust 




trust and less with people they distrust; and (3) socialization increase mutual 
understanding and thereby the scope for trust building (Kruke, 2009, p. 23).  
The problem for rural America and the federal government is that neither views 
themselves as dependent on the other and thus there is no motivation to seek trust 
relationships. “Nearly half of state legislators feel that state (35 percent) and local (11 
percent) governments are primarily responsible for providing solutions to rural problems, 
while one-quarter believe the federal government is most responsible” (W. K. Kellogg 
Foundation). Federal legislators in Congress view the notions of individualism and self-
reliance in rural communities, as a “challenge” to overcome when working toward 
governmental solutions to problems (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2002).  
It is the unique governance structure of conservation districts that set themselves 
apart from this divide. “Many Districts across our state and across the nation are a trusted 
place because of the nature of the board of supervisors. Many supervisors or directors of 
the conservation district are producers themselves” (R. Ledgerwood, personal 
communincation, September 10, 2009).  
Rural Americans trust districts because they are comprised of rural Americans. 
Another issue that damages the trust relationship between rural America and the federal 
government is intent. Covey contends that it is “either the real intent or the assumed or 
ascribed intent” of the parties that influences the trust relationship (Covey, 2006, p. 77). 
In response to a survey question asking conservation district supervisors and rural 
landowners whom they would report suspected terrorists to, 58 percent of respondents 
chose to report that information to local or county law enforcement, with just 15 percent 
choosing the FBI or DHS. However, when asked who is most responsible for fighting 
terrorism in their local area, 61 percent first chose either the FBI or DHS, with just 39 
percent choosing local or county law enforcement. The trusted preference was to report 
locally even when responsibility was perceived nationally.  
In investigating intent, Covey asks, “What is their motive or agenda? Do they 
really care about what’s best for everyone involved” (Covey, 2006, p. 77)? These 




lend itself to a trust relationship with rural America. By creating a new relationship with 
rural America through networking and partnering with conservation districts, the federal 
government can repair the trust relationship and create more trust in the fight against 
domestic terrorism. The federal government must be careful though, to make sure it does 
not fall into the trap of extending “counterfeit” trust (Covey, 2006, p. 227). There are two 
types of counterfeit trust–false trust and fake trust. False trust is “giving people the 
responsibility, but not the authority or resources, to get a task done” (Covey, 2006, p. 
227). Fake trust is “acting like you trust someone when you really don’t. In other words, 
you entrust someone with a job, but at the end of the day, you “snoopervise,” hover over 
or “big brother” the person” (Covey, 2006, p. 227).  
The federal government must be careful to avoid both of these counterfeit 
versions of trust in repairing its relationship with rural America. Engaging rural America 
in the war on terror will take investment and resources by the federal government in rural 
America, and the ability of DHS to take a hands-off approach to oversight. That is not to 
say no oversight. “Extend trust conditionally to those who are earning it and abundantly 
to those who have already done so” (Covey, 2006, p. 296). The benefits of such a 
program, though, are great. “By extending trust, you empower people. You leverage your 
leadership. You create a high-trust culture that brings out the best in people, creates high-
level synergy, and maximizes the ability of any organization” (Covey, 2006, p. 228).   
Kruke found that the effect of the cycle of distrust is that “coordination between 
the authorities and the international organizations… [was] difficult, mainly due to the 
mutual distrust and lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities” and that “lack of 
socialization between the different actors may lead to distrust just because actors have 
inadequate information about their counterparts” (Kruke, 2009, p. 35). Districts 
understand that trust is key to their interaction with their local landowners, and that to 
generate and keep that trust, relationships must be built. “Most landowners don’t like to 
be told what to do, especially if they don’t realize that what they are doing is wrong or if 
that is the way Grandpa did it. To change that attitude, you have to gain trust and work 
with the individual before you even tell them what is wrong” (M. Tobin, personal 




Districts interact with private landowners based on their “relationships, which are 
based on people, which are all different” (J. Culp, personal communication, September 24, 
2009). Some landowners might not want to be part of a formal program run by a 
governmental enforcement agency, or even a non-regulatory agency. However, if the 
opportunity exists to share information or resources, some might “step up to the plate on their 
own terms and participate without having to gain someone else’s trust in the government” (J. 
Culp, personal communication, September 24, 2009). Further, if just one or two innovators 
exist who might be willing to participate or provide terrorist-related indicator and warning 
information, this may be all that is necessary to generate interest from others. Districts “know 
the land managers in their area that are willing accept new ideas, new concepts, new this and 
that, and are motivated to make change based on new information” (R. Ledgerwood, personal 
communication, September 10, 2009). Still, some may “think their sheriff is a blooming 
idiot” and will be unwilling to cooperate with federal, state, and local law enforcement at all 
(R. Ledgerwood, personal communication, September 10, 2009).  
The public must accept any rural America-federal government partnership, especially 
a new organization designed to collect domestic intelligence (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). Using 
conservation districts as the bond that holds this relationship together does not create any new 
significant governmental structure. Districts have shown that they can respond quickly and 
effectively to governmental requests for assistance during times of drought and other 
disasters by tapping into their network of local, on-the-ground relationships with rural 
landowners, farmers, and ranchers. Educating rural America about rudimentary information 
collection methods and providing specific, targeted training for conservation district staff 
members is all that is needed. Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and 
maintain a high level of “institution based trust” with their constituents—trust in the districts 
themselves (Jackson, 2009). By providing training to them and instituting an effective public 
relations campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that training, 
rural Americans and district staff members can become another set of eyes and ears in the 
war on terrorism. The success of domestic U.S. intelligence efforts relies on “the forging of a 
deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, the 
collection and analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” (Loyka et 




IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
A. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 
The Power Versus Interest Grid (see Figure 14) for leveraging rural America in 
domestic counter-terrorism efforts illustrates the dynamic interaction between the amount 
of power a given stakeholder group has versus the amount of interest that group can have 
in the RIN. 
 
 





Many different groups of stakeholders exist that need to be coordinated to 
implement the RIN. As a network, a “central control” point for the RIN does not exist. 
Rather, a need to share information environment is created and each state fusion center, 
through a stakeholder group of local, state, and federal IC participants, oversees the 
information sharing protocols and links in the network. The power that any given group 
has in the Power Versus Interest Grid indicates how much influence they have in relation 
to the implementation and operation of any new intelligence gathering effort. The interest 
of a group is defined as the amount of importance or significance the group gives to such 
an effort to create a RIN. To engage such a disparate group of stakeholders and rural 
Americans in domestic counter terrorism activities, DHS should use community-policing 
principles. Rural law enforcement (LE) and the IC do not have the resources, culture, or 
technical understanding to engage this neglected but important segment of the American 
population without community-policing principles. Community policing allows LE and 
the IC to partner effectively with and gain the assistance of rural America to help fight 
the war on terrorism.  
DHS should also promote the use of community policing by rural law 
enforcement agencies to engage rural America in counter terrorism activities in rural 
America. Community policing has historically operated in a manner that works well in 
rural America. The close connection to the community, one-on-one personal contact and 
long-term relationships that the LE practitioner of community policing enjoys in rural 
America fit well into how rural America operates and generates support for the creation 
of the RIN.  
Each of the four dimensions of community policing has substantial advantages for 
engaging citizens in the war on terrorism to combat the new domestic terrorist threat 
when used in rural America (Cordner, 2001). In Dunham and Alpert’s book, Critical 
Issues in Policing, Gary Cordner writes about community policing (Cordner, 2001). He 






and organizational (Cordner, 2001). Each of these dimensions has elements that can work 
well if used in an overall strategy by the RIN stakeholders to engage rural America in the 
war on terror.  
1. Philosophical 
Cordner contends that the philosophical dimension of community policing is 
perhaps the most important (Cordner, 2001). It consists of citizen input, broad 
functionality, and personalized service. Citizen input to the LE and community policing 
process is critical to its success. Rural survey respondents consistently value helping their 
neighbors, getting along, and working together to solve problems (Hamilton, Hamilton, 
Duncan, & Colocousis, 2008). Rural Americans clearly have the mindset conducive to 
assisting LE. By having a broad functionality to LE, rather than just focusing on crime 
fighting, community-policing matches well with what LE finds in rural areas. Due to 
limited resources, but representing the only resource available, rural LE must do much 
more for rural communities than urban LE. Rural LE should partner with rural citizens to 
ease this burden. By providing personal service, rural LE gains the credibility necessary 
to build trust and relationships essential for rural citizens to aid and assist rural LE and 
the IC.  
2. Strategic 
Cordner says that three community-policing strategies are used to translate 
community-policing philosophy into action: re-oriented operations, geographic focus, and 
prevention emphasis (Cordner, 2001). Face-to-face communication is a key social 
mechanism by which rural citizens interact. It is also the key to re-oriented operations. 
Officers must interact with the community as the community does to develop trust. Once 
this trust is developed, LE sees rural citizens willing and able to provide support to LE 
operations. LE notices a reduction in resource expenditures, an increase in time savings in 
information collection and investigation, and has a better ability to focus resources while 
still maintaining that trust relationship. The emphasis community policing places on 




2001). Especially in rural America where citizens know each other well and have close 
ties, the placement of LE officers on a permanent basis within the community generates 
“trust, confidence and cooperation on both sides of the police-citizen interaction” 
(Cordner, 2001). As a result, rural LE, using community-policing principles, can access a 
network of rural citizens for information gathering purposes. If rural LE can create such a 
relationship, they are then able to do community policing without the police, as the 
citizens do LE’s job for them. Community policing also “emphasizes a more proactive 
and preventative orientation” (Cordner, 2001). LE and the IC can benefit from an 
orientation toward prevention in many areas in rural America. Security, food production 
and safety, pollution control, and other areas can be enhanced by having a rural LE focus 
on community policing principles. Perhaps most importantly, the entire culture of LE 
continues to change from one of just a narrow focus on crime fighting to one of 
identifying and preventing the unique problems and conditions of domestic counter-
terrorism efforts. Community policing principles serve to reinforce the notion that all 
Americans can contribute to the war on terrorism, not just LE.  
3. Tactical 
Cordner sites positive interaction, partnerships, and problem solving as the three 
most important tactical elements of community policing (Cordner, 2001). Local positive 
interactions between rural LE and citizens create a dynamic in society that leads to 
greater partnerships. Rural Americans do not have the resources available to them that 
urban citizens do, so building effective partnerships is much more important. Due to its 
connection to the land, rural America has a greater stake in issues that affect them locally 
than urban populations. Urban populations are highly mobile and transitory, while rural 
Americans are not mobile and have invested in their land and communities. Effective 
partnerships lead to effective problem solving, and community policing emphasizes 
problem solving. It is in the interest of rural citizens to resolve their problems and interact 
with one another because they are not as transitory as the urban population. The tactical 
community policing principles can be an effective tool that rural LE and the IC can use to 




4.  Organizational 
An effectively implemented community-policing program in rural America must 
be decentralized and have LE officers who are empowered to make their own decisions 
based on the LE organization’s values. Rural LE must wear many hats to protect their 
communities. LE organizations that implement these organizational aspects of 
community policing see that same organizational structure in the communities they serve. 
The communities also recognize this in the LE organization, which fosters trust, 
communication and understanding. To be effective, LE must operate very similar to the 
culture and community with which it is associated.  
The RIN strengthens information sharing and collaboration. The RIN creates a 
rural information network of landowners, farmers, and ranchers on private lands 
throughout America. After receiving training, they can report suspicious behavior and 
circumstances they observe to their local, trusted government representative from their 
conservation district. Districts pass that information on to the fusion center for further 
analysis and dissemination. A database is created for use by local landowners, farmers 
and ranchers to exchange resource needs and supplies before, during and after terrorist 
events and disasters. Rural populations can actively engage with the IC, law enforcement, 
and DHS in the fight against terrorism.  
The RIN helps combat the new asymmetrical domestic terrorism threat. Rural 
areas have become a base of operations for terrorists. Further, agriculture and food 
supplies are targets of terrorists. The FBI has identified Eco-terrorism as the number one 
domestic terrorism threat, and eco-terrorists conduct their operations closer to rural areas 
than other types of terrorists. By leveraging rural America in domestic intelligence efforts 
through a partnership with conservation districts, LE and IC gains the assistance of a vast, 
untapped reservoir of information collection and more readily meets the new asymmetric 
terrorism threat.  
The RIN also creates a more resilient rural population. Homeland security, 
disaster preparation, mitigation, response and recovery efforts for all citizens of rural 




collection through a partnership with the 2,946 different local conservation districts. 
Conservation districts occupy a unique place in their local communities due to their non-
regulatory nature and can be leveraged by DHS as a force multiplier for information 
gathering and disaster preparation, mitigation, response and recovery purposes.  
B. OBSTACLES 
Promoting community-policing principles on a national level in rural America 
involve encroaching on current governmental spheres of influence. DHS has sought to 
use its Citizens Corps program to engage its citizens in the war on terrorism and domestic 
preparedness efforts. Citizen Corps, while serving as the umbrella organization for a 
number of different citizen engagement initiatives, does not fill the leadership role of 
coordinating citizens in rural America for information gathering purposes to combat 
terrorism. While Citizen Corps acknowledges, “we all have a role in hometown security,” 
there are little actual security measures and initiatives in most of its programs (The 
National Office of Citizen Corps - FEMA Community Preparedness Division). Most of 
its programs revolve around preparation, mitigation, response and recovery efforts related 
to natural disasters and terrorism. Little to no drive exists to engage the public, let alone 
the rural public, in LE support activities.  
Also, traditional LE culture frowns on community policing. A great emphasis of 
community policing is prevention, and “within both informal and formal police cultures, 
crime solving and criminal apprehension are usually more valued than crime prevention” 
(Cordner, 2001). DHS must lead and foster this enhanced use of community policing 
principles in rural America, or else it runs the risk of not receiving the support from the 
traditional LE and IC. If the LE and IC do not buy into community-policing principles, 
the lack of buy-in undermines any effort to engage rural America in community policing 
and the war on terrorism.  
Furthermore, some might view an effort to use community policing to engage 
rural America in the war on terrorism as another Operation TIPS. Operation TIPS was a 




concerns raised by opponents of Operation TIPS were many, ranging from a lack of 
openness to a lack of oversight (Cavoukian, 2003). The use of community-policing 
principles serves to diffuse the privacy arguments of privacy right advocates and others 
because a centralized system to target does not exist. Further, community-policing 
principles are less of a governmental program or directive and more of a philosophy of 
interaction between LE and citizens. America needs to engage its rural citizens directly as 
a force multiplier in the war on terrorism with a targeted, local relationship-building 
effort. Rather than funneling information into one central depository, the efforts of rural 
Americans can serve to augment, not replace, those of LE and the IC. Rural Americans 
are not a group that LE and the IC collects information on, but rather is a source of 
information, interaction, support and prevention.   
A challenge for the RIN is to maintain the on-going cooperation with stakeholders 
in all aspects of the program. Stakeholders are intimately involved in setting requirements 
and continued support of the RIN. To overcome this, the RIN can create a stakeholder 
group that strives to include, acknowledge, and motivate stakeholders to participate and 
maintain that participation through the duration of the RIN. 
Another challenge is to maintain the on-going participation of the fusion center. 
Active monitoring and maintenance of the relationship between the fusion center and the 
conservation districts and other stakeholders ensures that requirements are identified, 
intelligence product meets the needs of customers, and identified deliverables are met. 
Continued funding of the RIN is also a challenge. Continued funding is needed to 
maintain the readiness of rural citizens to assist in information gathering and the changing 
nature of the domestic terrorist threat. The current twenty-four month DHS grant funding 
scheme does not lend itself to the continued operation of the RIN. A stable source of 
funding needs to be found, so that the knowledge of information collection procedures is 
not lost.  
If such a system as the RIN were created, a clear marketing campaign to rural 
America needs to be undertaken so they are aware of the nature and extent of the 




local governmental agency is an area of great concern for rural Americans. While most 
rural Americans have a good relationship with their local government agency, the same 
cannot be said of state or federal government. The use of the Protected Critical 
Infrastructure Information (PCII) program, if properly marketed to rural Americans, 
should alleviate fears that they have concerning disclosure of critical infrastructure and 
key resource information. Information submitted that meets the requirements of the PCII 
are protected from public disclosure, and cannot be used by any governmental entity for 
regulatory purposes. Similar procedures need to be created to address information 
supplied by landowners and others under the RIN to protect them from any possible 





The reason to establish an information-collection system in rural America is to 
leverage rural America as a force multiplier in the war on terror. The citizens that 
comprise rural America have long been ignored by the efforts to wage the war on terror, 
and have been told, along with their urban counterparts, that the government wages the 
war on terror, not citizens. Homeland Security’s message of vigilance in the war on 
terrorism and of prevention, mitigation, and recovery after terror events or natural 
disasters is not taking root in rural America because the communication methods are not 
effective. Terrorists are increasingly targeting rural America and using rural America for 
operational support and training (Smith, 2008). The special demographics, skills and 
abilities of rural America warrant further consideration by DHS as a front on the war on 
terror.  
The findings and recommendations of this research advocate the creation of a 
domestic intelligence-gathering network, which utilizes the nation’s 2,946 local 
conservation districts to interact with rural citizens. Conservation districts, as a unit of 
local government, occupy unique places in their communities due to their non-regulatory 
nature. As a result, they have a high degree of trust among those they serve. Conservation 
districts forge a partnership with rural Americans and state fusion centers for information 
gathering purposes. Intelligence experts at state fusion centers analyze this information 
and use it to support the war on terror.  
In their book, Blue Ocean Strategy, W. Han Kim and Renee Mauborgne argue 
that organizations should move beyond incremental competitive strategies called “red 
oceans” to “blue oceans” where they build new value based on creating new demand 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). They do this by establishing a “strategy canvas,” which 
illustrates the value innovation being created. Figure 15 shows a strategy canvas based on 
the principles of Blue Ocean Strategy as it applies to the RIN. The strategy canvas for the 
RIN graphically illustrates the RIN’s value innovation. By increasing the avenues of local 




Americans and the federal government, more trust is created, the relationship between the 
federal government and rural America is strengthened, the U.S. IC gains an ally in areas 
of America that currently are being overlooked, and a light can shine into the dark of 
domestic terrorism in rural areas. 
 
 
Figure 15.   RIN Strategy Canvas Diagram. (After: Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). 
What is needed is not a good strategic plan in a red ocean; homeland security 
needs to get out of that ocean entirely. The traditional disciplines that perform the duties 
of homeland security—law enforcement (FBI, state police, etc.), the military, the IC, 
border security, and others still need to keep incrementally improving their operations by 




needs to operate in a “blue ocean” to meet the demand that exists. That demand comes 
from citizens who are bitter about having to wait in line at airport security checkpoints, 
who do not want to have to present a passport when they cross into Canada, and who do 
not understand why Islamic jihadists want to kill Americans. Homeland security must 
meet these demands with a new strategy. The Department of Defense was able to operate 
with a blue ocean strategy during the Cold War and motivate Americans by using 
education and behavior designed to combat the threat that existed at that time. DHS must 
create that same sort of strategy in the war on terrorism or risk losing the support of a 
generation of Americans. Like Blue Ocean Strategy says, the “demand is out there, 
largely untapped” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 211). What is needed is a shift in focus 
from “competing to a focus on value innovation” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 211).  
What value innovation is the DHS bringing to the war on terrorism? Each 
governmental agency can do its part as before, but what is needed is a completely new 
way of looking at the problem of defeating asymmetrical terrorism. Perhaps a return to 
true federalism principles and understanding that “the best knowledge is often at the 
fringe of an organization” (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 204) is the recombination 
that creates a value innovation to move DHS into that blue ocean. The RIN allows 
information from the fringe to reach the critical nodes of the network.   
What sets the RIN apart from other intelligence and information gathering efforts 
is the value innovation creates for DHS: trust. Reestablishing trust with such a large 
group of Americans sets DHS apart from other agencies. Conservation districts have the 
trust of other local, state and federal governmental organizations, as well as the 
landowners and farmers in rural America. 
Not only should DHS use a blue ocean strategy of value innovation to implement 
the RIN, it should also use principles of “megacommunities.” The megacommunity 
concept was developed by Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and 
Christopher Kelly in their book, Megacommunities (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & 
Kelly, 2008). The heart of the megacommunity strategy is harvesting the energy created 




private sector (businesses) and non-governmental organizations (Gerencser, Van Lee, 
Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 55). These three branches “come to megacommunities 
when they recognize that the problems facing them are more complex than they can solve 
alone” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 54). Megacommunities 
develop when the interests of the three branches “intersect over time” (Gerencser, Van 
Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 54). However, these three sectors must have an 
exchange or dialogue for them to meet any new complex societal problem effectively 
(Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 62).  
The need to harness the dynamic tension between the government, businesses and 
non-governmental organizations is present in rural America. Conservation districts can 
and should be used to harness this tension. Conservation districts can assist the three 
sectors in the exchange of information needed to bring the full resources of rural America 
to bear on the war on terrorism. Conservation districts are familiar with working with the 
“dynamic tension” created by businesses, the public, and the government. They already 
work with millions of cooperating landowners and operators to help them manage and 
protect land and water resources on all private lands and many public lands in the United 
States (National Assocation of Conservation Districts).  
The mission of conservation districts is “to coordinate assistance from all 
available sources—public and private, local, state and federal—in an effort to develop 
locally-driven solutions to natural resource concerns” (Sims, 2007). To execute this 
mission, conservation districts frequently create megacommunities to accomplish their 
natural resource conservation objectives. If DHS were to engage conservation districts to 
create megacommunities in rural areas to fight terrorism, then those citizens could 
become a force-multiplier in the war on terrorism. Conservation districts routinely work 
with a variety of public, non-profit and private sector partners to “reach the goals they 
cannot achieve alone” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 28), which is 






part of numerous programs that deal with disaster preparedness and mitigation. 
Additionally, they have technical expertise to operate in rural areas, and are trusted and 
respected by members of rural America (Jefferson Conservation District, 2006).  
Currently, DHS encourages the reporting of “suspicious activity” through the use 
of their Web site to leave a tip for the FBI (Report Incidents), and the federal government 
is moving to a national suspicious activity environment with the Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, 
2010). However, rural Americans are not comfortable involving the federal government 
with issues in their local area. Megacommunity members can be “kept apart by their own 
constituents, by the aspects of their goals that are at cross-purposes, and by their 
perceptions of each other” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 70). The 
unease that rural Americans have with the federal government is an example of this 
concept. However, if they had a local contact point with whom they are comfortable 
interacting, they would be much more likely to make that report or voluntarily allow 
access to their land to gather information or conduct surveillance.  
Conservation districts have experience working with multiple local, state, federal 
and tribal agencies. They are experienced at handling government grants, cost share 
requirements, and the documentation necessary for grant purposes. Districts frequently 
take the lead in bringing together diverse governmental entities, community 
organizations, and individuals into formal agreements for mutual aid and support in times 
of disaster or for other purposes. They create their own resources and information guides 
tailored to their own communities needs. 
A small investment by DHS into a training program for district supervisors and 
staff can allow DHS to partner with the districts in providing a local connection to 
landowners and other rural Americans. District staff can leverage their position in their 
communities to receive information on possible terrorist activities in rural America and 
serve as a repository of information for landowners to disclose to first responders 
voluntarily in the event of natural disasters. Rural landowners can disclose hazardous 




that information when they arrive on scene. Further, they can also provide a list of 
resources (buildings, materials, fuels, etc.) to be made available to first responders and 
others who might need them in times of disaster or terror events.  
Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly in Megacommunities describe a 
December 2001 simulation in Washington D.C. involving the three sectors of a 
megacommunity to explore bioterrorism. Their summary of the outcome includes two 
key points: a “widespread recognition of the need for a new kind of partnership in the 
pursuit of homeland security,” and that “[p]reparedness would require new levels of 
communication and cooperation across public-private, local-national, and military-
civilian boundaries” (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008). Conservation 
districts can bring all of these principles to the war on terror for DHS.  
Any new organization designed to collect domestic terrorism information must be 
acceptable by the public (Jackson, 2009, p. 9). By utilizing a Megacommunity strategy to 
interact with its rural citizens, DHS and America can gain a force multiplier for use in its 
efforts in the war on terrorism. The success of DHS’s efforts relies on “the forging of a 
deep partnership with the American nation” (Crumpton, 2005, p. 198), and “the truth is, 
the collection and analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies” 
(Loyka et al., 2005, p. 6).  
Conservation districts have worked hard to generate and maintain a high level of 
“institution based trust” with their constituents–trust in the districts themselves (Jackson, 
2009). This trust was not created by a top-down hierarchical structure, but rather by a 
bottom-up, dispersed network of local, rural people providing services where needed.  
By providing training to rural Americans and instituting an effective public 
relations campaign to allay any fears members of the public might have about that 
training, rural Americans and conservation district staff members become another set of 
eyes and ears in the war on terror. At a time of ever-increasing demands on the federal 
government and the DHS, districts and rural Americas can provide increased situational 




APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  




1. How can conservation districts help in homeland security? (Can conservation 
districts be used as a resource to respond to natural disasters and terrorist events?)  
 
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to help in 
homeland security?  
 
3. Describe how your conservation district is currently involved in local homeland 
security efforts?  
 
4. Describe your perception of your conservation district’s level of knowledge about 




1. Describe how conservation districts interact with rural landowners, farmers, and 
ranchers. 
 
2. How can conservation districts reach rural landowners, farmers and ranchers 
about homeland security?  
 
3. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts in 
communicating with rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland 
security?  
 
4. Describe how conservation districts collaborate with other local, state and federal 
governmental entities in your area. 
 
5. Describe any information your conservation district receives from local, state, or 
federal law enforcement about homeland security issues in your area. 
 
6. Describe any information your conservation district receives from local, state, or 











1. How willing would your conservation district be to share homeland security 
information with governmental agencies above and below your level of 
government? 
 
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to share 
homeland security information with governmental agencies above and below your 
level of government?  
 
3. How willing would your conservation district be to share homeland security 
information with private landowners, farmers, and ranchers?  
  
4. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts to share 
homeland security information with landowners, farmers, and ranchers?  
 
5. Who in your area should be most responsible for homeland security?  
  
6. How would you describe your conservation districts’ relationship or interaction 
with that entity that is most responsible for homeland security in your area?  
  
7. Where or to whom should your conservation district report information to about 
suspicious activities or persons in your local area?  
  
8. Could your conservation district be a place where local landowners, farmers and 
ranchers report suspicious activities or persons?  
      
9. Is there anything about conservation districts that would make landowners, 
farmers or ranchers more likely to report suspicious activities or persons to the 
conservation district rather to some other governmental entity?  
  
10. Describe how you would feel those most responsible for homeland security 
should interact with local landowners, farmers, and ranchers?  
  




1. How can landowners, farmers, and ranchers help in homeland security?  
 
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for landowners, farmers, and ranchers 






3. Describe how you are currently involved in local homeland security efforts?  
 
4. Describe your level of knowledge about the occurrence of terrorism and natural 




1. Describe how rural landowners, farmers, and ranchers interact with conservation 
districts. 
 
2. How can conservation districts reach rural landowners, farmers and ranchers 
about homeland security?  
 
3. What are some of the obstacles that you see for conservation districts in 
communicating with rural landowners, farmers and ranchers about homeland 
security?  
 
4. Describe how you collaborate with local, state and federal governmental entities 
in your area. 
 
5. Describe any information you receive from local, state, or federal law 
enforcement about homeland security issues in your area. 
 
6. Describe any information you receive from local, state, or federal emergency 




1. How willing would you be to share homeland security information with 
governmental agencies? 
 
2. What are some of the obstacles that you see for you to share homeland security 
information with governmental agencies?  
 
3. How willing would you be to share homeland security information with your local 
conservation district?  
  
4. What are some of the obstacles that you see for you to share homeland security 
information with your local conservation district?  
 
5. Who in your area should be most responsible for homeland security?  
  
6. How would you describe your relationship or interaction with that entity that is 




7. Where or to whom should you report information to about suspicious activities or 
persons in your local area?  
  
8. Could your conservation district be a place where local landowners, farmers and 
ranchers report suspicious activities or persons?  
      
9. Is there anything about conservation districts that would make landowners, 
farmers or ranchers more likely to report suspicious activities or persons to the 
conservation district rather to some other governmental entity?  
  
10. Describe how you would feel those most responsible for homeland security 
should interact with local landowners, farmers, and ranchers?  




APPENDIX B.  SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. How involved is your conservation district in local emergency services efforts? 
 
Response Percent Response Count  
57.6 19 Not involved 
39.4 13 Somewhat involved 
3.0 1 Heavily involved 
 
 
2. To your knowledge, has your conservation district ever provided staff, equipment 
or technical support to the public or another state agency in responding to a 
natural disaster or terrorist event? If so, please indicate the type of support below. 
 
Response Percent Response Count  
100.0 2 Staff support 
0.0 0 Equipment 
100.0 10 Technical support 
 
  
3. Do you feel that it would be helpful to have a non-law enforcement and non-
regulatory local contact to report suspicious behavior or circumstances to?  
 
Response Percent Response Count  
51.5 17 Yes 
48.5 16 No 
 
  
4. Do you believe you have enough information to decide if there is a terrorism 
problem in your local area? 
 
Response Percent Response Count  
15.6 5 Yes 
84.4 27 No 
 
  
5. Do you feel you know enough about possible terrorist activities in your area to 
report it if you see it? 
 
Response Percent Response Count  
32.3 10 Yes 




6. If you felt that there were potential terrorists in your local area, would you report 
them?  
 
Please pick your top three choices. 
 
First Second Third Response 
Count 
 
31.6(6) 36.8(7) 31.6(6) 19 The local police department 
50(2) 25(1) 25(1) 4 The local emergency services department 
50(1) 50(1) 0(0) 2 A local governmental agency (fire department, 
NRCS) 
46.4(13) 28.6(8) 25(7) 28 The county sheriff’s office 
0(0) 50(1) 50(1) 2 The state emergency services department 
27.8(5) 27.8(5) 44.4(8) 18 The Washington State Patrol 
22.2(2) 33.3(3) 44.4(4) 9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
30(3) 50(5) 20(2) 10 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0 The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) 





7. Who do you feel is most responsible for fighting terrorism in your area? Please 
rank each choice from those most responsible to those least responsible. 
  
Most Responsible    Least Responsible Response 
Count 
24(6) 20(5) 8(2) 20(5) 16(4) 4(1) 0(0) 4(1) 4(1) 25 Local 
police  
4(1) 17(4) 4(1) 8(2) 13(3) 17(4) 13(3) 17(4) 8(2) 24 Local 
EMD 
0(0) 0(0) 11(2) 5(1) 0(0) 5(1) 21(4) 21(4) 37(7) 19 Local 
govt. 
agency 
27(7) 19(5) 27(7) 19(5) 8(2) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 26 County 
sheriff 
0(0) 5(1) 5(1) 10(2) 19(4) 24(5) 24(5) 0(0) 14(3) 21 State 
EMD 
5(1) 14(3) 46(10) 27(6) 0(0) 0(0) 5(1) 0(0) 5(1) 22 WSP 
31(8) 27(7) 15(4) 12(3) 4(1) 4(1) 4(1) 4(1) 0(0) 26 FBI 
46(12) 19(5) 4(1) 4(1) 19(5) 4(1) 4(1) 0(0) 0(0) 26 DHS 
0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 13(3) 21(5) 8(2) 25(6) 33(8) 24 FEMA 






8. Do you feel that terrorism prevention is a high priority for your local area?  
 
Response Percent Response Count  
0.0 0 Yes 
40.6 13 No 
37.5 12 It is important, but there are 
other things that are more 
important 
12.5 4 It is not important and there 
are other much higher 
priorities in my area 




9. Do you feel that natural disaster mitigation efforts are a high priority for your 
local area?  
 
Response Percent Response Count  
51.5 17 Yes 
27.3 9 No 
21.2 7 It is important, but there are 
other things that are more 
important 
0.0 0 It is not important and there 
are other much higher 





10. How does your district get disaster or terrorism information? Please choose all 
that apply. 
 
Response Percent Response Count  
12.9 4 The local police department 
41.9 13 The local emergency 
services department 
29.0 9 A local governmental 
agency 
32.3 10 The county sheriff’s office 
16.1 5 The state emergency 
services department 
12.9 4 The Washington State Patrol 
(WSP) 
3.2 1 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) 
9.7 3 The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) 
9.7 3 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency 
(FEMA) 
51.6 16 Radio reports 
48.4 15 Television 
54.8 17 Internet 
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